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INTRODUCTION 
“We are interested in protecting the work of art for public 
reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of 
providing for private enforcement of this public interest.”1 
 
In 1990, the Copyright Act was amended to name visual 
artists, alone among protected authors, possessors of “moral 
rights,”2 a set of non-economic intellectual property rights 
originating in nineteenth-century Europe.  Although enhancing 
authors’ rights in a user-oriented system was a novel 
undertaking,3 it was rendered further anomalous by the statute’s 
designated class, given copyright’s longstanding alliance with 
text.4  And although moral rights epitomize the legacy of the 
Romantic author as a cultural trope embedded in the law, 
American culture offered little to support or explain the apparent 
privileging of visual artists over other authors.5  What, if not a 
 
1 John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 
1023, 1041 (1976). 
2 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A 
(2006)). 
3 The presence or absence of moral rights in copyright law has historically 
marked the divide between author-oriented civil law countries and user-oriented 
common law countries, but that line has blurred in recent years with common law 
countries increasingly adopting a version of moral rights. See, e.g., Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) pt 9 (Austl.); Copyright Act 1994, pt 4 (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77–89 (U.K.). 
4 See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 683, 685 (2012) (noting that the words, “the prototypical subject 
matter of copyright,” have dominated the law’s development). 
5 See Charlotte Burns, “Artists Are Seen as One Step Above Criminals”, ART 
NEWSPAPER, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Artists-are-
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legal or cultural disposition toward visual artists, precipitated 
the enactment of a moral rights statute like the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”)?  This Article demonstrates that the 
answer is less related to authorship concerns than would 
reasonably be surmised from a doctrine premised on the theory 
that a creative work embodies the author’s honor, personhood, 
and even soul.6   
The question, and its revealing answer, has been obscured by 
the more obvious issue of VARA’s ineffectiveness.  VARA, an 
emphatically contained statute,7 has generated a remarkably 
disproportionate degree of scholarly interest, most of which 
reflects a desire to expand its reach and scope.8  However, 
commentators usually discuss VARA’s limitations within the 
confines of serving visual artists and works of art, not other types  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seen-as-one-step-above-ciminals/24654 (quoting artist Paul McCarthy in title, who 
was referring to American culture); Carol Becker, The Artist as Public Intellectual, 
in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUALS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 236, 239 (Gigi Bradford et al. eds., 2000) 
(discussing societal mistrust of artists and stereotype as “somewhat irresponsible, 
less than adult”). 
6 The term “moral right” resulted from a direct translation of the French term 
droit moral; however, the rights are more accurately described as authorial rights of 
personality, as in the German term urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht. Stephen R. Munzer 
& Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional 
Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 68 (2009). 
7 See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 47 (2010) (describing U.S. system as 
more minimalistic than either civil or common law regimes). 
8 The sheer number of VARA articles is often remarked upon. See, e.g., Susan P. 
Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic 
Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 n.39 (2005) 
(contrasting artists’ lack of success in court with amount of VARA scholarship 
generated); Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The “Recognized Stature” Standard in 
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1939 n.22 (2000) (“Moral 
rights, not surprisingly, are a favorite of academics, and articles on the subject far 
outnumber the cases in which moral rights are invoked.”); Law Students Crazy Over 
Visual Artists Rights Act, CLANCCO (June 1, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://clancco.com/wp/ 
2010/06/law-students-crazy-over-visual-artists-rights-act. 
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of authors.9  In other words, the moral rights doctrine in the 
United States is typically perceived as a branch of “artists’ 
rights.”10 
This Article argues that VARA did not merely allocate moral 
rights to a circumscribed group of authors, but repurposed them.  
VARA’s conceptual underpinnings, while glossed with Romantic 
rhetoric, were primarily informed by a different subject, the 
unique art object.  Thus, to argue that VARA does not adequately 
protect artists overlooks its more basic purpose: a “method”—to 
borrow from the quote above—of serving the presumed public 
interest in art preservation. 
VARA was conceptualized foremost as a statute honoring 
unique, valuable objects of art; the artist was secondary.  This 
inverted balance of the very connection between creator and 
created that traditional moral rights law enshrines, however 
slight, has powerfully shaped the law’s doctrinal landscape in the 
United States.  Although VARA assumes the Romantic author as 
a vital premise, it ultimately regulates objects—the consumption 
of art rather than its production—acting as a tiny virtual 
museum whose hermetic confines are always in tension with the 
sweep of its ascribed cultural role.  Despite the voluminous  
 
 
 
 
9 See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 407, 408 (2009) (“Scholarly research has lamented the weakness of U.S. 
protection for artists . . . .”); Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of 
Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 906 (1993); Burton Ong, 
Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 298 n.5, 303 (2003); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic 
Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France 
and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 364 (1998); Jill R. 
Applebaum, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based on 
the French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 210–12 (1992); Robert J. 
Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned 
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 376–78 (1995). One prominent exception appears in 
Professor Kwall’s proposal for moral rights reform that would encompass a broad 
class of creative authors. See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 7, at 149. 
10 See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 42–43 (1998) (defining moral rights as reflecting the “unique 
relationship between an artist, the creative process, and the resultant art”). Even 
critics of the doctrine tend to focus on its implications for artists. See, e.g., Amy M. 
Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009); Lindsey A. Mills, 
Note, Moral Rights: Well-Intentioned Protection and Its Unintended Consequences, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 443, 444 (2011). 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
2013] CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW 51 
corpus of scholarship critiquing VARA, the specific cultural 
fissures prompted by its system of realizing moral rights through 
art preservation remain unaddressed.11   
Recently, Amy Adler attacked VARA’s premises from the 
vantage of postmodern “anti-art” theory, positioning the 
Romantic author and art itself as historical anachronisms.12  
While this Article acknowledges anti-art conceptual tendencies 
as a crucial component of VARA’s cultural misalignment, the 
analysis here uses a broader epistemology to accommodate a 
diverse field of expression where no single theory dominates, and 
in which the author is not as yet dead.  However, neither does 
this Article expand upon the deeply internal process of human 
creativity charted by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall.13  Instead, this 
Article offers a sociocultural perspective of the moral rights 
doctrine as it developed in the United States, positioning VARA 
as both a culmination of particular values and a constitutive 
force in perpetuating them.  Although this Article is not the first 
to notice that VARA’s emphasis falls on the object rather than 
the artist, the assumptions embedded in this priority and VARA’s 
resulting social ruptures as arts policy, as moral rights doctrine, 
and as copyright law have not been documented.   
Part I offers an overview of traditional moral rights theory, 
particularly the right of integrity, and outlines relevant strains of 
law and culture that preceded the enactment of VARA.  Part II 
discusses how VARA functions as a statute that mediates artists’ 
rights through the physical object, and how the deliberate 
synthesis of preservation theory with orthodox moral rights 
philosophy hamstrings both ends.  Part III identifies cultural 
assumptions embedded in three prominent attributes of the art 
object conceptualized as protected under VARA—material, 
cultural, and transcendent—and discusses their conflicting 
impulses in the law.  Finally, Part IV concludes that the “object 
model,” infused with deterministic theories of modernism and 
 
11 That the statute’s problems cannot be traced exclusively to its narrow scope is 
suggested by its complicated interaction with the art world. See, e.g., Virginia 
Rutledge, Institutional Critique: Virginia Rutledge on Christoph Büchel and Mass 
MoCA, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1, 2008, at 151, 382 (pointing out, with respect to a case in 
which an artist and art museum were adversaries, that the issues were less about 
VARA’s scope than the values it reflects).  
12 See Adler, supra note 10, at 265, 285. 
13 E.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic 
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947–48 (2006). 
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cultural evolution, must be dismantled for moral rights to 
assume a viable and meaningful role in copyright law.  Through 
this discussion, this Article offers a discursive platform for 
redirecting the predicate theory of the moral rights doctrine 
toward a contemporary construct of authorial dignity. 
I. MORAL RIGHTS BACKGROUND 
This section contrasts moral rights theory in its original 
European incarnation, a function of philosophical ideas about 
personhood, with its doctrinal topography in the United States, 
explicitly rationalized with societal goals.  Selected social, 
political, and art historical developments in twentieth-century 
America are identified to contextualize VARA’s enactment. 
A. Moral Rights Orthodoxy 
Although there is no universal system of moral rights law,14 
the nineteenth-century French droit moral established the 
dominant conceptual paradigm,15 influenced by the philosophies 
of Kant and Hegel, that a creative work is not simply an external 
object but the communication of an author’s thoughts, imbued 
with his personality.16  Under this construct, moral rights are 
non-economic, inalienable rights that transcend the economic 
formalities of sale.  They protect the artist who “projects into the 
world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of 
public use.”17 
 
14 See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and 
the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 230 (1995) (noting a 
lack of consensus among civil law jurisdictions). 
15 See ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: 
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ¶¶ 1.63–1.64 (2006) (discussing 
evolution in France through court decisions in mid-nineteenth century). Some argue 
that the distinction between civil and common law countries is more conceptual than 
practical. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 
AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 72–73 (2007). Contra Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and 
the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright 
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (1994). 
16 Netanel, supra note 15. Hegel is generally credited with originating the 
philosophy underlying the “dualist” French system, where copyright law protects an 
author’s economic rights and the droit moral protects the personal rights arising 
from the author’s projection of self into the work. Id. at 19–21, 23. 
17 Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). 
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The moral right of integrity,18 the central focus of this 
Article, requires the purchaser to respect the work in its original, 
authentic form.  John Merryman illustrated this right in his 
seminal article that, importantly, used visual art as the primary 
vehicle for explaining moral rights.19  In the French case he 
described, the owner of a painted refrigerator with six panels 
attempted to sell one panel as if it were a complete work by artist 
Bernard Buffet.  Buffet brought an action to prevent the separate 
sale of the panel and succeeded.20  As explained by Merryman, 
“Distortion, dismemberment or misrepresentation of the work 
mistreats an expression of the artist’s personality, [and] affects 
his artistic identity, personality, and honor.”21 
The purpose of the right of integrity is anchored in the 
artist’s personality.  Thus, civil law countries historically have 
not included a right to prohibit the complete destruction of an art 
work on the theory that unlike misrepresentation, mere absence 
cannot harm an artist’s reputation.22  Further, although moral 
rights are perpetual in France, the rights remain personal to the 
artist; heirs are presumed to inherit only a right of  
 
 
 
 
18 The four basic rights typically embraced within the doctrine include: (1) the 
right of disclosure; (2) the right to withdraw; (3) the right of attribution (to have 
one’s name or authorship recognized); and (4) the right of integrity of the work of 
art. See, e.g., Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil 
Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 203 (1995); Raymond Sarraute, 
Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1968). 
19 Merryman, supra note 1, at 1027. 
20 Id. at 1023 n.1 (discussing Buffet v. Fersing, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court 
of appeal] Paris, 1962, D. Jur. 570, 571 (Fr.)). 
21 Id. at 1027. 
22 See KWALL, supra note 7, at 44; Roeder, supra note 17, at 569 (observing that 
“even in France,” there was precedent declining to prohibit destruction as a moral 
right); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 110 (1997); Cyrill 
P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 371 (2006); 
Marina Santilli, United States’ Moral Rights Developments in European Perspective, 
1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 100 (1997) (noting right to prevent destruction 
“remains quite controversial in Europe”). But see Edward J. Damich, The New York 
Artists’ Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 
1742 (1984) (stating that the French right of integrity includes prohibition of 
complete destruction). 
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enforcement.23  Some jurisdictions, such as Germany, refuse to 
recognize a perpetual right of integrity because doing so would 
convert the right into an instrument of cultural preservation.24 
B. Early Conceptions of Moral Rights, American Style 
For many years, the United States resisted joining the 
international copyright treaty known as the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne”), 
founded in 1886, at least partially due to its moral rights 
provisions.25  Although the American response to Berne has a 
complex history,26 one prominent feature was unwavering 
opposition by the motion picture industry and broadcasters due 
to the adaptation needs found crucial in these industries.27  
Lawmakers considered moral rights incompatible with the classic 
social utility model of copyright law and the corresponding 
principle of unlimited alienability.28 
 
23 Dietz, supra note 18, at 214. 
24 Rigamonti, supra note 22, at 370–71. 
25 E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 
6917 (“[C]onsensus over United States adherence [to the Berne Convention] was 
slow to develop in large part because of debate over the requirements of Article 
6bis.”); see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting 
that protecting moral rights was a “prominent hurdle” in the debate over joining 
Berne). Article 6bis, the moral rights provision, currently reads: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer 
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the 
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
art. 6bis, 828 U.N.T.S. 223, 235 (amended Sept. 28, 1979). 
26 See H.R. 5853, 73d Cong. (1933); S. 3047, 74th Cong. (1935) (“Duffy Bill”); 
H.R. 10632, 74th Cong. (1936) (“Daly Bill”). See generally Willy Hoffman, European 
Legislation and Judicial Decision in the Field of Copyright in 1930, 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. 
REV. 369, 369–84 (1931) (discussing the “Vestal Bill”); Barbara A. Ringer, The Role 
of the United States in International Copyright—Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. 
L.J. 1050, 1059 (1968) (noting that United States declined a limited-time offer to 
adhere to 1908 Berlin text); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in 
American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 178–82 (2008).  
27 See, e.g., International Convention of the Copyright Union: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 75th Cong. 20 (1937) 
(statement of Edwin P. Kilroe, Chairman, Copyright Comm., Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America). 
28 Netanel, supra note 15, at 9–13. 
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This country’s first explicit judicial invocation of the moral 
right of integrity in 194929 involved the wholesale destruction of 
art—a large fresco mural in a church that had been painted over 
at the insistence of the parishioners.30  A New York court rejected 
the artist’s moral rights argument,31 but referenced two salient 
writings in its opinion, both of which addressed destruction.32  
The first, a law journal article, described the personality-driven 
understanding of the integrity right that includes a right to 
prevent distortion, but not destruction:  “To deform [the artist’s] 
work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not 
his own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he has 
not done; the destruction of his work does not have this result.”33 
The other, a landmark treatise on international copyright 
law by Stephen Ladas, asserted that moral rights should be 
extended to authors for the destruction of art work because, 
“[t]he maintenance and preservation of a work of art is invested 
with the public interest in culture and the development of the 
arts.”34 
Both writers contemplated cultural heritage as a strong 
rationale for adopting moral rights and thus viewed them as 
perpetual.35  Subsequent academic writings on moral rights 
continued this entanglement of a public interest in preserving 
culture and the author’s rights of personhood.36  Although 
 
29 The right of attribution was first referenced slightly earlier. See Vargas v. 
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 523–27 (7th Cir. 1947). 
30 Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in N.Y., 194 Misc. 570, 571–72, 89 
N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1949). In 1938, Alfred Crimi was selected to 
execute a large fresco mural painting inside a church in Manhattan. Eight years 
later, the mural was painted over because parishioners objected to his depiction of a 
bare-chested Christ, claiming that it placed more emphasis on physical attributes 
than spiritual qualities. Id. at 570–72, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814–15. 
31 Id. at 574, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (noting that the United States was not a 
signatory to Berne). 
32 See Roeder, supra note 17, at 569. See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY (1938). 
33 Roeder, supra note 17, at 569. 
34 LADAS, supra note 32, § 287. 
35 Roeder merely saw the public interest as vesting at the artist’s death, but not 
before. See Roeder, supra note 17, at 574–75 (“The real reason . . . for protection of 
the moral right after the creator’s death lies in the need of society for protection of 
the integrity of its cultural heritage.”). Ladas saw moral rights as a basis for serving 
the public interest both during and after the artist’s lifetime. LADAS, supra note 32, 
§§ 275, 286. 
36 See Sidney A. Diamond, Legal Protection for the “Moral Rights” of Authors 
and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 258 (1978) (“[T]he destruction of a 
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America was not unique in this conflation, it marks a doctrinal 
shift from the natural rights underpinnings of the droit moral to 
social policy.37 
C. Historical Context 
At the risk of oversimplifying, this section presents some 
selected background in twentieth-century art and cultural norms 
to situate VARA historically. 
1. High Culture and Cultural Policy 
The “culture” or “cultural heritage” referenced by the above 
legal scholars was synonymous with the arts, or “high culture.”38  
Not unrelatedly, the perceived American identity vis-à-vis the 
fine arts was one of inferiority to Continental Europe, a 
sentiment that only began to change post-World War II.39  
American artists assumed their first prominent international 
role in these years when the Western art world was dislocated 
from Paris to New York by the Abstract Expressionists, the heirs 
apparent to European modernism.40  The United States formally 
entered the Western canon with their highly abstract, massive 
canvases.  The associated critical approach to modern art became 
formalism, an aesthetic theory that in its most extreme form  
 
 
 
work without the author’s consent removes something from the cultural heritage of 
society.”); Arthur L. Stevenson, Jr., Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal, 
6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 89, 92 (1955) (in addition to protecting personality, 
the moral right “seeks to preserve the cultural heritage of the nation.”); Mary A. Lee, 
Comment, Moral Rights Doctrine: Protection of the Artist’s Interest in His Creation 
After Sale, 2 ALA. L. REV. 267, 272 (1950) (“The public’s interest in the preservation 
of literature, music, drama, and art is a strong argument for adopting the doctrine 
[of moral rights].”). 
37 See ADENEY, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 3.01–3.53. 
38 This sentiment may be divined from the pre-war understanding of the term 
“culture,” as well as the writers’ comparative vantages, looking to Western Europe. 
See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 17 (“Busy with the economic exploitation of her vast 
natural wealth, America has, perhaps, neglected the arts . . . .”). 
39 See, e.g., John Kreidler, Leverage Lost: Evolution in the Nonprofit Arts 
Ecosystem, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUALS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 5, at 147, 147–50 (“America had a 
hefty cultural inferiority complex by the late 1950s, by no means a new phenomenon 
in the nation’s history.”). 
40 See generally DIANE CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: 
THE NEW YORK ART WORLD, 1940–1985 (1987). 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
2013] CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW 57 
renounced content beyond the self-referential material of the 
picture plane, a teleological narrative crafted by the 
extraordinarily influential art critic Clement Greenberg.41 
The Abstract Expressionists were branded with a distinct 
cultural mythology and American ideology—heroism and 
individual liberty—that coincided with America’s new wealth and 
power.  For the first time, government deliberately aligned itself 
with the arts, and did so publicly;42 it actively promoted Abstract 
Expressionism abroad, absorbing these artists into Cold War, 
anti-Communist rhetoric.43  Until that point, the government’s 
principal foray into the arts had been the Federal Art Project, a 
Depression-era program motivated more by economic recovery 
than support for the arts.44  The new theme of triumphant 
individualism likewise departed from the collectivist orientation 
of the 1930s project.45 
By the early 1960s, amid America’s enhanced consumption 
and abundance, the fine arts became perceived as a scarce 
resource threatened by increasingly pervasive forms of mass 
 
41 See, e.g., Jonathan Harris, Modernism and Culture in the USA, 1930–1960, in 
MODERNISM IN DISPUTE: ART SINCE THE FORTIES 2, 42–65 (1994) [hereinafter 
MODERNISM IN DISPUTE]. 
42 John D. Rockefeller III testified in Congress that democratic government and 
the arts are “in league with one another, for they both center on the individual and 
the fullest development of his capacities and talents.” Margaret J. Wyszomirski, 
Raison d’Etat, Raisons des Arts: Thinking About Public Purposes, in THE PUBLIC 
LIFE OF THE ARTS IN AMERICA 50, 50 (Joni M. Cherbo & Margaret J. Wyszomirski 
eds., 2000) (quoting John D. Rockefeller III before the U.S. Subcommittee on 
Education, Arts & Humanities on October 31, 1963 on behalf of Joint Resolution 104 
to establish a National Council on the Arts and National Arts Foundation). 
43 See Harris, supra note 41, at 37, 40. See generally SERGE GUILBAUT, HOW 
NEW YORK STOLE THE IDEA OF MODERN ART: ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM, FREEDOM, 
AND THE COLD WAR (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2008). 
44 The Federal Art Project (1935–1943) was established as one of many welfare 
programs under the Works Progress Administration. See Lawrence D. Mankin, 
Federal Arts Patronage in the New Deal, in AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO CULTURE: 
GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS 77, 77–91 (Kevin V. Mulcahy & Margaret Jane 
Wyszomirski eds., 1995); Emily Genauer, New Horizons in American Art, 
PARNASSUS, Oct. 1936, at 3, 3–7. 
45 The Federal Art Project “ ‘proceeded on the principle that it is not the solitary 
genius but a sound general movement which maintains art as a vital, functioning 
part of any cultural scene.’ ” Genauer, supra note 44, at 3 (quoting Holger Cahill, 
national director of the Federal Art Project). Cahill had also justified the Project in 
contravention of European traditions and modernism, stating, “[i]f [the taste of the 
American people] was not always of the best, it was an honest taste, a genuine 
reflection of community interests and of community experience.” Harris, supra note 
41, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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culture.46  The “scarce resource” ideology was vividly expressed in 
the Kennedy era, when the federal government aggressively 
forged high-art policy initiatives, as realized in the 1965 
Congressional legislation that created the National Endowments 
for the Arts and Humanities.47  But the alliance of government 
and art had begun to unravel even as it formed.  After the 1960s, 
U.S. cultural policy became defined by a “policy of no policy,” 
rationalized as cultural pluralism, with support for the arts 
primarily shouldered by individual donors and charitable 
organizations, incentivized through tax exemptions.48 
2. The Post-War Art Market 
The “art world” today is a quasi-autonomous global market, 
associated with the wealthiest sector of society.  Thomas Crow 
traces the contemporary roots of its high-end extravagance to 
marketing efforts by gallery owners Leo Castelli and Ileana 
Sonnabend in the 1950s and 60s.49  Castelli galvanized a 
successful national market for works by American artists, and he 
exported this model abroad, relying on the highly recognizable 
imagery of Pop art.50  America had its first art boom in this new 
vernacular,51 but Pop’s blurring of the distinction between high 
art and mass culture also helped trigger the breakdown of 
Greenberg’s trajectory of modernism. 
 
 
46 See, e.g., Glenn Wallach, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE, supra 
note 5, at 1, 2–3; see also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Notes on a National Cultural 
Policy, DAEDALUS, Spring 1960, at 394, 399 (“As the problems of our affluent society 
become more qualitative and less quantitative, we must expect culture to emerge as 
a matter of national concern and to respond to a national purpose.”). 
47 Wallach, supra note 46, at 3; see also Holland Cotter, The Boom Is Over. Long 
Live the Art!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at AR1 (remarking that NEA was 
established “so Americans wouldn’t keep looking, in the words of Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr., like ‘money-grubbing materialists’ ”). 
48 See, e.g., Kevin V. Mulcahy, The Government and Cultural Patronage: A 
Comparative Analysis of Cultural Patronage in the United States, France, Norway, 
and Canada, in THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE ARTS IN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 138, 
145 (describing system as “the distinguishing characteristic of the American cultural 
condition”). 
49 Thomas Crow, Art and Its Markets: Historical Returns, ARTFORUM, Apr. 1, 
2008, at 286, 288. 
50 Id. For characteristic examples of Pop art, see works of Claus Oldenburg, Roy 
Lichtenstein, James Rosenquist, and Andy Warhol. 
51 See CRANE, supra note 40, at 35–41. 
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With a proliferation of artistic styles and an increased 
audience, the art world infrastructure in the United States 
underwent considerable expansion into the 1970s,52 buttressed by 
extrinsic financial support from corporations53 and government;54 
fine art extended its social and professional reach through its 
incorporation into the American education system.55  The decade 
that preceded the enactment of VARA was glitzy, as witnessed in 
the highly publicized and now iconic auction sale of Van Gogh’s 
Irises for nearly $54 million in 1987,56 while “neo-expressionist” 
painters attained levels of publicity formerly associated with the 
entertainment industry. 
Even during these expansive years, however, making a living 
as a professional artist was not necessarily viable.  Artists in the 
United States have historically continued their pursuit by 
supplementing income with non-artistic jobs, under the general 
theory that they are “doing what they love.”57  Indeed, because of 
 
52 As summarized by one author: 
Museums added space and activities devoted to modern art; galleries 
handling modern art increased from 20 to 300; from a dozen or so, the 
number of serious modern art collectors grew to thousands; exhibitions by 
painters increased by 50 percent; according to some estimates, the number 
of people calling themselves artists grew from 600,000 in 1970 to over a 
million by 1980. . . . 
VERA L. ZOLBERG, CONSTRUCTING A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS 63 (1990). Between 
1970 and 1990, the number of artists (i.e., including musicians, writers, dancers, 
etc.) doubled in the United States, growing at twice the rate of the overall labor 
force. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, ARTISTS IN THE WORKFORCE 1990–2005 1 
(2008), available at www.arts.gov/research/artistsinworkforce.pdf; see also Jonathan 
M. Rotter, Law, Economics, Technology, and the Social Construction of Art, 37 J. 
ARTS MGMT. L. & SOC’Y 281, 283 (2008) (citing similar statistic). 
53 See CRANE, supra note 40, at 5–8. 
54 To place government support in perspective, the NEA budget rose from $2.9 
million in 1966 to approximately $165 million in 1987. Its 2011 budget was 
approximately $155 million. National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations 
History, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://www.arts.gov/about/Budget/ 
AppropriationsHistory.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
55 CRANE, supra note 40, at 8–11 (stating that the number of Masters of Fine 
Arts degrees awarded by American schools increased from 525 in 1950 to 8,708 in 
1980). 
56 Three years later, Van Gogh’s Portrait of Dr. Gachet would sell for $82.5 
million to Japanese businessman Ryoei Saito. Steven R. Weisman, One Man, Two 
Masterpieces and Many Questions in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at 1; see also 
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 7 (1999) (discussing Saito’s 
“joke” announcement that he would have the work cremated with him). 
57 According to census data, artists are twice as likely as others in the U.S. labor 
force to have earned a college degree, yet earn relatively less compensation for their 
education level. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 52. 
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the growth in number of artists, competition for representation in 
galleries and museums intensified, leaving only a fraction to 
benefit from the enhanced market.58  And even among the 
commercially successful, some artists complained of the inequity 
in resale profits that inured only to the benefit of the new class of 
investor-collectors.59  The concept of “artists’ rights” and “art law” 
emerged in this era, with the market booming but scant 
protection for artists.60 
3. Cultural Property and Art 
Around the time that the United States began carving a 
niche in the production and marketing of high culture, a much 
broader conception of culture and “cultural property” was 
developing in a distinct international convergence of government 
policies and cultures.  Concerns over the deliberate targeting of 
cultural property by the Nazis resulted in the 1954 Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property.61  Subsequent 
deliberation on cultural property assumed a nationalistic 
orientation, reflected in the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.62  UNESCO’s  
 
 
58 CRANE, supra note 40, at 136. 
59 One famous example is Robert Rauschenberg’s confrontation with collector 
Robert C. Scull. In an auction held at Sotheby Park Bernet in 1973, Scull sold 
Rauschenberg’s combine-painting, Thaw, for $85,000 (purchased by Scull for $900 in 
1958) and Double Feature for $90,000 (purchased for $2300). Rauschenberg 
reportedly said to Scull, “I’ve been working my ass off for you to make all this profit,” 
and shoved him. See Mark L. Favermann, Artists’ Rights in the U.S.A.: Current 
Action, LEONARDO, Spring 1978, at 120, 120. 
60 Id. at 120–21 (discussing legislation reflecting awareness of “the increasing 
importance of the role of artists in contemporary society and of their punitive 
treatment in the worlds of commerce and government”); James J. Fishman, The 
Emergence of Art Law, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 481, 482 (1977) (“The major factor in the 
development of art law has been the art explosion and cultural boom of the past 
twenty years.”). 
61 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 240 (asserting in preamble that “each 
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world”). 
62 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 
231, 232; see also Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2004, 2009–12 (2007) (discussing the evolution of cultural property law and 
UNESCO’s departure from the universalist view of world culture to nationalistic 
orientation). 
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main concern, however, was the culture of indigenous 
populations, antiquities, and sites of historic interest; the arts 
were only one part.63 
In contrast to the exaltation of individualism in the 
American embrace of Abstract Expressionism, cultural property 
theory values collective production and collective meaning.64  And 
unlike in the domain of intellectual property, here the United 
States remains a “market nation”—an importer from “source 
nations” rather than an exporter.65  Yet the Western fine art 
system has a prominent point of conceptual overlap with the 
academic and economic valuation of antiquities or artifacts from 
poorer nations: the authentic, tangible object.  Both types of 
objects have high symbolic and often nationalistic value, and 
their preservation is deemed a public benefit, especially in 
museums, which imply a degree of public access.  These objects 
are often grouped under the same academic rubric of art history 
and may share the auspices of the same museum, even though 
cultural property consists of objects not necessarily considered 
“art” in their original context and purpose. 
D. The Entanglement of Preservation and Moral Rights 
Not without coincidence, the most influential of early moral 
rights enthusiasts, John Merryman, likewise assumed a 
prominent role in theorizing cultural property law, and his 
reverence for the physical object is unequivocal.66  For Merryman, 
 
63 See Wallach, supra note 46, at 1–10. For attempts to define cultural property, 
see Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural 
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569–70 (1995) (“[T]hose objects 
that are the product of a particular group or community and embody some 
expression of that group's identity, regardless of whether the object has achieved 
some universal recognition of its value beyond that group.”); Joseph L. Sax, Heritage 
Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (1990) (stating that the terms “heritage” and “cultural 
property” have no specific meaning and may include “human artifacts as well as 
natural objects or places”). 
64 See Mezey, supra note 62, at 2010–11 (arguing that both universalist and 
nationalist approaches to cultural property implicate groups). 
65 Benjamin Folkinshteyn, National Treasure: Implicit Protections of Cultural 
Property in the United States, 37 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & SOC’Y 143, 144 (2007); Mezey, 
supra note 62, at 2010–11. 
66 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 
CALIF. L. REV. 339, 355 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, The Public Interest] (“The 
essential ingredient of any cultural property policy is that the object itself be 
physically preserved.”). 
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the interests of artists and the public always intersect at 
preservation.  For this reason, moral rights law is 
unproblematical in serving “dual purposes: to protect the artist 
against alteration of the work of art and to protect the public 
against alteration or destruction of the culture.”67  For Joseph 
Sax, a cultural preservation scholar, moral rights similarly 
enable the pursuit of this other vital interest:  “When American 
legislatures finally began to consider enacting droit moral 
statutes, the question understandably arose, why not protect the 
art, which is the ultimate product of the artist’s work and the gift 
of creative genius to the world, as well as his or her 
reputation?”68 
A flurry of moral rights bills were introduced in the late 
1970s and 80s, at the federal level and in individual states, 
primarily aimed at the visual arts.69  Seizing upon America’s 
recently-acquired stature in the international art world, 
Merryman implored in 1976, “Given the cultural importance of 
American art, should our law be modified in such a way as to 
protect the integrity of works of art?  I believe that the answer to 
that question is clearly ‘yes.’ ”70  The literature on moral rights 
tracks this “cultural importance,” dramatically increasing as 
American art became relevant internationally, economically, 
culturally, and in the academic humanities.  In 1940, the paucity  
 
 
 
 
67 Id. at 343–44. 
68 SAX, supra note 56, at 22 (“Despite the conceptual distinction . . . protection of 
an artist’s moral right can simultaneously implement the society’s interest in 
protecting its artistic heritage.”). 
69 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (2012) (effective 1985) (applying to 
works of “fine art”); CAL. CIVIL CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2012) (effective January 1, 
1980) (applying to works of “[f]ine art” of “recognized quality”); Visual Artists Moral 
Rights Amendment of 1979, H.R. 288, 96th Cong. (1979) (same); Visual Artists 
Moral Rights Amendment of 1977, H.R. 8261, 95th Cong. (1977) (aimed at “the 
distortion, mutilation, or other alteration” of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
works”); Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of 
Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 47 
(1980) (“[T]here is little question that at least a right to protect art works from 
mutilation is emerging in this country.”). 
70 See Merryman, supra note 1, at 1042 (also referencing “the triumph of 
American art” as a reason for adopting moral rights). “Triumphalist” rhetoric was a 
hallmark of Clement Greenberg’s essays. See, e.g., Clement Greenberg, “American-
Type” Painting, in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 208, 208 (1989). 
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of scholarship was remarked upon, but by 1980—ten years prior 
to VARA—it was already “the subject of exhaustive scholarly 
attention.”71 
A portion of the enacted state statutes spoke to the public 
interest as much as the artists.72  The popular wisdom of 
entangling moral rights with the protection of unique objects of 
art acquired a stronghold, as summed up by Edward Damich:  
“Protecting irreplaceable works from irreversible physical 
changes presents the most compelling case for moral rights 
protection.”73 
II. VARA: OBJECT AND AUTHOR 
This section highlights how cultural preservation policy 
bested artist-based rationales in VARA’s legislative history.  It 
then provides a textual analysis demonstrating how VARA’s 
operative provisions, despite using moral rights language, 
privilege the object over the artist.  The section concludes with a 
discussion of the mutual restraints embedded in VARA’s dual 
objectives. 
A. Legislative History 
VARA’s immediate legislative history begins in ambivalence, 
with the United States’ accession to the Berne Convention in 
1989.  Specifically, the United States took steps to ensure that its 
accession would require no new legislation, in keeping with its 
 
71 DaSilva, supra note 69, at 39. 
72 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(a) (West 2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) 
(“[T]here is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic 
creations.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1 (West 2012); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 989(c) 
(effective Jan. 1, 1983) (permitting certain charitable institutions to enforce some 
rights granted to artists). The New York statute offered an alternate paradigm. See 
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2012) (making no mention of public or 
societal interest in art). At the time VARA was enacted, eleven states had artists’ 
rights or art preservation statutes, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
California, New York, Maine, Louisiana, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New 
Mexico, and Rhode Island. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 8, 22 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6919 & n.18. 
73 Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a System of 
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (1990); see also 
Bird, supra note 9 (“Without moral rights protection artworks could be placed in 
jeopardy.”); Elizabeth M. Bock, Note, Using Public Disclosure as the Vesting Point for 
Moral Rights Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 153, 162 (2011) 
(noting VARA serves “the public’s interest in preserving its culture through 
preserving art”). 
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longstanding position that functional equivalents to moral rights 
could be found in a patchwork of existing state and federal laws, 
including contract, privacy torts, unfair competition, defamation, 
copyright, the Lanham Act, etc., sufficient to meet the 
requirements in Article 6bis.74  Congress enacted the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which provided that 
Berne was not self-executing and that Berne’s provisions “do not 
expand or reduce” existing authors’ rights.75  Further, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
subsequently excluded Article 6bis from the “rights or 
obligations” listed therein.76 
Although VARA is clearly related to Berne accession, it was 
hardly an inevitable outcome; VARA was enacted on the last day 
of the 101st Congress, within a bill authorizing eighty-five new 
federal judgeships.77  The proposed bill, contrary to Berne, 
limited protection to the visual arts.  And Congress was explicit 
about its dual agenda: “protect[ing] both the reputations of 
certain visual artists and the works of art they create.”78  
Notably, copyright inequity for visual artists had long been a 
component of the moral rights conversation,79 including lack of 
resale royalty rights.80  This concern reappears in VARA’s 
 
74 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 15, at 25–26; Justin Hughes, American Moral 
Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 665–68. 
75 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 §§ 2–3, 
102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
76 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 304, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
77 KWALL, supra note 7, at 28; Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, in LANDMARK 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR LEGACY 13, 14 (Christopher Heath & 
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011). 
78 H.R. REP. NO. 101–514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915. 
79 See 123 CONG. REC. E6270–72 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1977) (statement of Rep. 
Drinan) (asserting that “ ‘visual’ artists are the least organized and least protected 
among artists in America”); Favermann, supra note 59, at 120–21. 
80 E.g., Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 3 (1989) (“[T]o secure the rights of authors of pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works to prevent the distortion, mutilation, or other alteration 
of such works, to provide for resale royalties, and for other purposes.”); see also 133 
CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. Markey) (referencing 
work by Jasper Johns sold for $3.6 million, purchased for $2,250 in 1960). 
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immediate legislative history,81 but what passed in 1990 were the 
Berne-mandated non-economic rights of integrity and 
attribution.82  VARA rights were rendered waivable.83 
While detailing their efforts to limit and contain the bill, 
legislators also described the purpose of the statute as 
“consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the 
Constitutional provision they implement: ‘To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ”84  Analogous to copyright’s 
utilitarian thrust, “ ‘[t]he theory of moral rights is that they 
result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages 
the author in the arduous act of creation.’ ”85  At times, the bill 
was pitched as “fill[ing] a gap” in copyright law that had eluded 
visual artists because their work was treated as a “physical piece 
of property, rather than as an intellectual work, like a novel.”86  
But at other points, more quasi-religious rhetoric was employed, 
suggesting a different kind of right altogether, e.g., “[t]his bill 
recognizes that title to the soul of an art work does not pass with 
the sale of the art work itself.”87 
The most consistent argument for moral rights emerged in 
art preservation, as its own end.  The Act is specifically 
predicated on the “preservation model” of moral rights, whereby 
the destruction of works of art not only affects an artist’s 
reputation, but also “represents a loss to society.”88  According to 
its supporters, “[t]he bill furthers the preservation concept and 
provides in the most effective way for the protection of the work by 
 
81 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 
6918 (“Visual artists, such as painters and sculptors, have complained that . . . the 
American copyright system does not enable them to share in any profits upon resale 
of their works.”). 
82 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006). Resale royalty rights and waiver were made the 
subject of a future study by the Copyright Office. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (1990). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e). 
84 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
85 Id. (quoting Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 32 (1990) (statement of Ralph Oman, Reg. of 
Copyrights)). 
86 136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) 
(“It is time that visual artists receive the fundamental copyright protection for the 
integrity of their work already provided to authors.”). 
87 Id. 
88 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6926. 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
66 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:47   
giving the artist the right of integrity and the power to enforce 
it.”89  Under this construct, artists are cast as enforcement 
mechanisms for preserving art rather than persons seeking 
copyright parity, private reputational protections, or bargaining 
power. 
VARA’s legislative history also promotes it as an important 
tool in cultural preservation efforts for the public welfare,90 for 
example, “By creating a right of integrity, [VARA] . . . protects 
society against the mutilation and destruction of those works of 
visual art that make up an important part of our cultural 
heritage . . . .”91  Professor Jane Ginsburg testified that the 
integrity right would not only “enhance the creative environment 
in which artists labor,” but would also “enhance our cultural 
heritage.”92  Legislators and witnesses littered their statements 
with references to “American culture,” “our civilization,” and 
“national treasures.”93 
VARA’s prototypical art object and its vulnerability was 
memorably illustrated.  In 1986, two Australian entrepreneurs 
purchased a Picasso print, Trois Femmes, cut it into 500 one-inch 
squares and offered to sell each square for $135.94  The 
consequences of this act, said Representative Markey, constitute 
the type of abhorrent, irreparable damage “which passage of the 
bill we are discussing today will protect against.”95  As he  
 
 
89 Id. (emphasis added); see also 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) 
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“We should always remember that the visual arts 
covered by this bill meet a special societal need, and that their protection and 
preservation serve an important public interest.”). 
90 See 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. 
Markey) (“Works of art . . . belong to no one because they belong to all of us.”). 
91 136 CONG. REC. H13,313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); see also 135 CONG. REC. 
S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Congress can no 
longer overlook its responsibility to safeguard the Nation’s artistic heritage.”).
 
92 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 82 (1990) (statement of Prof. Jane Ginsburg) (emphasizing 
“interests of artists and public alike”). 
93 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916–17. 
94 136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
The newspaper ads read, “Yes, your very own beautiful framed Picasso piece, in the 
most original and exciting offer.” Id. 
95 Id. VARA actually would not have prevented slicing and dicing a painting by 
Picasso because the rights inure only to living artists; Picasso died in 1973. R. B. 
Ekelund, Jr. et al., The “Death-Effect” in Art Prices: A Demand-Side Exploration, 24 
J. CULTURAL ECON. 283, 284 (2000). 
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explained, intimating the threat of a distinctly public harm, “[w]e 
don’t want profiteers roaming the world giving artistic 
masterpieces the chop.”96 
B. VARA’s Text 
As suggested by VARA’s somewhat hasty, surreptitious 
enactment, its text was not subject to intensive discussion or 
deliberation,97 and it offers an odd balance of personhood and 
object interests.  VARA’s author-orientation is manifest 
principally through limitations on the rights it confers, such as 
non-transferability and duration fixed at the author’s life.98  The 
statute’s protected class is defined and delimited by the object, as 
are the implementing provisions of the right of integrity. 
1. Art, Defined 
VARA created a new category of works of art rather than 
utilizing copyright law’s preexisting definition, “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.”99  As a co-sponsor explained, “we 
have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works 
of art that will be covered.”100  VARA’s limited reach to unique 
physical objects that exist in single copies or limited editions was 
viewed as a “critical underpinning of the limited scope of the 
bill”101 and was associated with the preservation agenda.102 
VARA’s “work of visual art” consists of “a painting, drawing, 
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy,” as well as “a still 
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,” or 
 
96 136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
97 See supra text accompanying note 77; see also KWALL, supra note 7, at 147 
(arguing that VARA’s primary problem arises from lack of thoughtful deliberation). 
98 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d)(1), (e) (2006). An exception to lifetime duration applies if 
the work at issue was created before the effective date of the statute, assuming title 
has not yet transferred. In that instance, the moral rights term is coextensive with 
the copyright term provided under § 106. Id. § 106A(d)(2). For collaborative works, 
the duration extends to the last surviving author. Id. § 106A(d)(3). Lifetime duration 
is inconsistent with Berne’s requirement that moral rights last for a period 
coextensive with copyright protection in each member state. See KWALL, supra note 
7, at 37. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 
100 135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 101–514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921. 
102 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H3114 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement by Rep. 
Moorhead) (“[T]his narrow definition is essential to ensuring that the legislation is 
limited to protecting and preseving [sic] qualifying works that exist in single copies 
or limited editions.”). 
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signed, numbered limited editions of the same.103  In conjunction 
with this selective inventory, VARA also identifies exclusions, 
most notably a “motion picture or other audiovisual work,” and a 
work made for hire or one made for promotional or advertising 
purposes.104  VARA also bars “any work not subject to copyright 
protection under this title.”105 
2. Prohibiting Modification, and Exceptions 
Although VARA’s modification provision is aimed at 
prejudice to an artist’s “honor or reputation,”106 it does not 
recognize any harm that leaves the original object intact.107  
Thus, distortion of a reproduction, however widely disseminated 
or personally injurious, is not within VARA’s purview.108  For 
example, VARA offered no assistance to Frederick Hart in his 
lawsuit against Warner Brothers for its rendition of his sculpture 
 
103 17 U.S.C. § 101. The full provisions read: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, 
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively 
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark 
of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition 
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the 
author. 
Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (language adopted verbatim from Berne 
Convention). An author of a work of visual art has the right “to prevent any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.” Id. 
107 Id. § 106A(c)(3) (providing that any “reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or 
other use of a work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification 
described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a)”). 
108 See id. To contrast, in a French case from 1911, the son of Francois Millet 
brought an action against two publishers for their reproductions of Millet’s painting, 
The Angelus. Millet’s son argued that both publishers should be enjoined from 
publication for misrepresenting his father’s work. The court agreed that changes in a 
woman’s bonnet and scarf, lighting, and other similarly “vulgar” modifications 
constituted an offense of Millet’s right of integrity. Similarly, a French court found 
that Galeries Lafayette, a department store, violated Henri Rousseau’s right of 
integrity by displaying reproductions of his work in a different color and form than 
the original. See Merryman, supra note 1, at 1029–30 (discussing the Millet and 
Rousseau cases). 
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Ex Nihilo in the film Devil’s Advocate, given that the original 
object was untouched.109  One commentator explains that 
“imposing liability in these situations would not further the 
paramount goal of the legislation: to preserve and protect certain 
categories of original works of art.”110 
Despite the oft-mentioned public interest in preserving art, 
VARA is disassociated from the act of displaying art to the 
public; in theory, a mutilated object may injure the artist’s honor 
or reputation even if it remains hidden in a closet.111  As a 
corollary, the discontinued display of an art work is not 
prohibited if the object remains unaltered.112  Finally, the statute 
specifically excepts modification caused by “public presentation, 
including lighting and placement,” unless resulting from gross 
negligence.113 
3. Destroying Art 
VARA’s anti-destruction provision, ironically, exceeds the 
norms of virtually all civil and common law countries, as well as 
the minimalist requirements of Berne, by redressing the 
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of art.114  As the 
 
109 The movie featured Satan as a managing partner of a New York law firm, 
and his penthouse included a wall-sized bas-relief resembling Ex Nihilo. Near the 
end, the human forms in the bas-relief appear to writhe erotically, which Hart found 
offensive to his beliefs. See 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE 
GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 1282–83 (3d ed. 2005). 
The case settled, with Warner agreeing to edit the DVD version and attach a 
disclaimer. Id.; see also The Devil’s Advocate—Warner Bros. and Frederick Hart, 
BENEDICT.COM, http://www.benedict.com/visual/devil/devil.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 
2013) (showing video clips and disclaimer). 
110 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8D.06(B)(2) (2010), quoted in Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48, 
51 (D.P.R. 2004) (dismissing a VARA action based on unauthorized reproduction of 
painting in advertising brochures). 
111 See, e.g., Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 627 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“VARA lays its focus on the acts of alteration themselves, without 
reference to subsequent display.”). 
112 English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (finding VARA inapplicable when real estate 
development would obstruct the view of several murals because the murals “will not 
be physically altered in any way”). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2006). 
114 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (providing the right “to prevent any destruction of a work 
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right”). For further discussion on destruction, see sources 
cited supra note 19. Although one might read into Berne a “right ‘of preservation’,” it 
is not required expressly. Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, 
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Second Circuit aptly observed in the first VARA case litigated, 
protecting a work from destruction “represents a fundamentally 
different perception of the purpose of moral rights,”115 meaning 
one based on “the public interest in preserving a nation’s 
culture.”116  If the right protects personality, the court elaborated, 
“destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of 
deformed or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist.”117  
Only works of “recognized stature” warrant protection from 
complete destruction, a gatekeeping mechanism not defined in 
the statute nor required by the mutilation provision.118  In 
considering the proposed beneficiaries of this right—artist and 
society—it is only consistent with the latter that the protected 
work has stature.119  Finally, this provision does not include the 
“honor or reputation” language employed under modification.120 
 
Text and Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (2001). The closest 
approximation of such a right would be in Swiss law, where an owner must offer to 
sell the work back to its creator prior to destruction. KWALL, supra note 7, at 44. 
115 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
116 Id.; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (“This provision is preservative in nature: Congress was concerned that the 
destruction of works of art represented a significant societal loss.”), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); 136 CONG. REC. H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 
1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (explaining that the destruction provision 
was included because “[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when . . . works are modified or 
destroyed”). 
117 Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82. However, several commentators contend that 
protecting an artist’s work from destruction soundly supports a personality-based 
integrity right, positing destruction as the endpoint of disrespect on a continuum 
with mutilation. See, e.g., id. (citing 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE 1044 n.128 (1994)); 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 16:24 
(2012) (“Destruction of a work certainly shows the utmost contempt for the artist's 
honor or reputation.”); KWALL, supra note 7, at 45 (arguing that the notion of 
destruction having no adverse consequences “is not relevant to those instances 
where a work is destroyed in a manner that subjects the creator to shame or 
embarrassment”); Robinson, supra note 8, at 1964 (“[T]here is little validity to the 
argument that the complete destruction of an artist’s work of art results in no harm 
to his honor or reputation.”). 
118 In theory, the artist need not have recognized stature. See Robinson, supra 
note 8, at 1952; cf. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 n.12 (opining that work may attain 
stature after filing lawsuit). 
119 See, e.g., Damich, supra note 73, at 955 (“[A]dopting a quality criterion 
changes the focus of the statute from moral rights to art preservation.”). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006). However, omission of the honor or 
reputation language may simply reflect oversight or careless drafting. See supra 
notes 77, 97 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Paralysis of Equipoise 
VARA’s proposition of protecting the artist and preserving 
the object, while seemingly an enhancement of traditional moral 
rights, is substantially limiting at either end.  Some of the 
consequences for artists are identified in the preceding section.  
In addition, at the policy level, emphasizing physical 
preservation and types of objects marginalizes the intrinsic, 
intellectual dimension of producing art, a result that nearly 
subverts the statute’s grounding as intellectual property law.121  
Jane Ginsburg has described VARA as a private “Landmarks 
law” for art work, asserting “real moral rights do more than 
that.”122  More pejoratively, a major treatise complains that “[a]t 
the abstract (or perhaps fustian) level, traditional copyright law 
protects art; by contrast, the Visual Artists Rights Act protects 
artifacts.”123 
In addition, despite emphatic containment, VARA’s object 
focus negatively redounds to other forms of creative expression.  
Because VARA only encompasses unique objects, its core mission 
of protecting authorship interests seems ill-disposed for 
incremental expansion to other media, whose regular existence is 
in copies.124  This is problematic if, like Professor Kwall, one 
believes that “[a]uthors of literary, musical, and other 
copyrighted works are as vulnerable to moral rights violations as 
are visual artists.”125  Several scholars contend that VARA’s 
narrow class of eligible objects has fostered “negative spillover” 
effects;126 not only are state statutes preempted, but VARA’s 
 
121 As noted, one stated premise of the VARA was achieving copyright parity for 
visual artists. See 135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of 
Rep. Markey) (“Unlike the works of literary or performing artists, artworks created 
by visual artists are treated more as physical objects then as expressions of the 
artistic creativity of their authors.”); supra notes 79, 86 and accompanying text. 
122 Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United 
States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 10–11 (2001). 
123 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 110, § 8D.06(A)(2) (footnotes omitted). 
124 See The 101st Congress: A Review of Amendments to the Copyright Act, 37 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 462, 466 (1990) (“[VARA] should be regarded as an initial, 
extremely tentative step toward a federal regime for moral rights.”). 
125 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”: Narrative’s Implications for 
Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 
(2001); see also KWALL, supra note 7, at 148–49 (calling for expanded protection). 
126 See, e.g., Bird, supra note 9, at 424 (“Courts now invariably interpret VARA 
to mean that no cause of action outside of VARA, regardless of its origin, can support 
a claim that resembles a moral right because of VARA’s narrow application.”). 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
72 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:47   
existence has been construed as a pronouncement that Congress 
affirmatively rejects any right resembling moral rights outside of 
its limited scope.127  Thus, courts may have been more willing to 
entertain matters of authorial dignity before VARA framed the 
issue as one exclusive to fine art objects.128 
However, despite its considerable emphasis on the physical 
object, VARA is not a functional preservation statute.129  VARA’s 
preservation objective is reciprocally delimited by its personhood 
interests, most prominently the lifetime duration.130  Accordingly, 
a major fallacy of the Trois Femmes example relied upon by 
legislators is that VARA would not have prevented “the chop,” 
because Picasso was dead.  The statute lacks a key attribute of 
cultural preservation initiatives: perpetuity, or at least a decisive 
term, and, correspondingly, someone to exercise the right other 
than the artist.131  Moreover, VARA’s preservation goals limit 
America’s cultural heritage to not just art, but contemporary art.  
 
127 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34–35 
(2003); Rigamonti, supra note 22, at 405–08. 
128 See, e.g., Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 372, 267 
N.Y.S.2d 594, 603–04 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 
913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80. In that case, 
the defendant licensed Otto Preminger’s motion picture Anatomy of a Murder for 
television viewing. Preminger sought an injunction, complaining that the license 
agreements gave stations the right to cut portions of his film and offer commercial 
interruptions, which he claimed detracted from the film’s “artistic merit” and 
damaged his reputation. The court stated that “the law is not so rigid, even in the 
absence of contract, as to leave a party without protection against publication of a 
garbled version of his work.” Id. at 366, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 599. Although the court held 
for the defendant, it implied that if the movie were significantly mutilated, the 
director might have a case. Id. at 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603–04. 
129 Many scholars have focused on rectifying this aspect of its agenda. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Dillinger, Note, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual 
Artists Rights Act To Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 UMKC L. 
REV. 897, 899–900 (2007); Cambra E. Stern, Comment, A Matter of Life or Death: 
The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 849, 852 (2004); Seth Tipton, Note, Connoisseurship Corrected: 
Protecting the Artist, the Public and the Role of Art Museums Through the 
Amendment of VARA, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 274 (2009). 
130 Cf. Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph 
of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 361 (1989) (asserting with respect to 
state moral rights statutes that “[l]imited duration seems inconsistent with the 
interest of preservation”); Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists’ Rights and 
Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 463 (1994) (concluding that 
artists’ moral rights are not really intended for cultural preservation, due to lifetime 
limitation). 
131 VARA’s reliance on self-selection also does not make desirable preservation 
policy. 
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A masterpiece so renowned posthumously—the usual 
circumstance—will have no protection, making for strange 
omissions in this putative collection of American history.132 
In sum, considering its dual ambitions, VARA is highly 
flawed.  The next section unbundles the contradictions that 
inhere in fashioning moral rights around objects. 
III. OBJECT AND OBJECTIVE: SITES OF CONFLICT 
Because VARA aims to protect the integrity of objects, a 
district court found a “painful irony” when Swiss artist Christoph 
Büchel sought, in conjunction with his VARA counterclaims 
against the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art 
(“MASS MoCA”), to have his own work destroyed.133  Two years 
prior, Büchel had embarked on an installation called Training 
Ground for Democracy in MASS MoCA’s football field-sized 
gallery known as “Building 5,” at the museum’s expense.134  As 
the work progressed, the relationship between Büchel and the 
museum became acrimonious, and Büchel eventually terminated 
the project, accusing MASS MoCA of not following his 
instructions and exhibiting a lack of professionalism.  At this 
point, the museum had invested nearly $300,000—well over 
budget—and had postponed the already-publicized exhibition in 
an effort to meet Büchel’s demands and instructions, often 
delivered off-site.  MASS MoCA sought a declaratory judgment 
from a federal district court that it was entitled to display the 
work in its unfinished state, and Büchel counterclaimed under 
VARA, along with a request to have the work destroyed at the 
museum’s expense.135 
 
132 Professor Sax has remarked that “the operative provisions of [VARA] are 
unmistakably focused on the rights of the artist, rather than of the society.” SAX, 
supra note 56, at 26. 
133 As the district court noted, its comment was technically tangential to the 
legal issues because there is no cause of action to seek destruction under VARA; 
Büchel merely supplemented his moral rights claims with this request. See Mass. 
Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 n.7 
(D. Mass. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010). 
134 This arrangement was never memorialized in writing. Id. at 250. 
135 The district court held for the museum and dismissed Büchel’s VARA claims. 
See id. at 261. Despite the ensuing appeal, Büchel’s request for destruction became 
moot when the museum changed course and elected not to pursue the exhibition. 
The First Circuit partially vacated and partially affirmed the district court’s order 
dismissing Büchel’s claims and, in relevant part, held that Büchel had raised a 
material issue of fact as to whether the museum had modified the installation over 
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There was a “painful irony” in this case, wrote the district 
court in a footnote, because “one critical purpose of VARA is to 
preserve art.”136  The court explained, citing Franz Kafka, 
Vladimir Nabokov, and the poet Virgil, that, “[t]he public as the 
beneficiary of great art has its own legitimate interest in 
preservation, which sometimes can trump the artist’s will.”137 
Judge Posner’s positioning of the public interest over that of 
the artist illustrates how VARA’s object orientation has 
decentered its moral rights agenda.  Once authorship is 
subordinated to the preservation of “great art,” VARA loses its 
footing in copyright law’s doctrinal terrain.  Neither does U.S. 
policy or law offer a strong foundation for preserving visual art as 
a form of cultural heritage.  Indeed, it becomes fair to question 
what VARA is doing at all. 
This section is divided into three parts, reflecting facets of 
the archetypal objects implicated under the statute: material, 
cultural, and transcendent.  These qualities carry assumptions 
that inform VARA’s preservation theme, yet when 
contextualized, reveal conflicting impulses that have belied 
VARA’s implementation and discourse over the past two decades. 
A. The Physical Object 
“VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘work[s] of 
visual art . . . .’ ”138 
By assuming art preservation as a critical purpose, VARA 
adopts a museological stance.  It embraces the primacy of the 
unique, authentic art object as evidence of the author’s genius 
and as a complete narrative unto itself.139  Its broader cultural 
narrative is thus hierarchical, segregating certain types of 
material goods for heightened protection—an endeavor not 
 
Büchel’s objections, and as to whether the alleged modifications had a detrimental 
impact on the artist’s honor or reputation. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art 
Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2010). 
136 Buchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.7. 
137 Id. at 249 n.1. These authors charged others with posthumous destruction of 
certain unpublished works. See id. 
138 Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005). 
139 See Jan Marontate, Rethinking Permanence and Change in Contemporary 
Cultural Preservation Strategies, 34 J. ARTS MGM’T L. & SOC’Y 285, 286 (2005) 
(“[P]rofessional standards and practices in the museum field developed in a context 
where the art object itself was the primary record of the creative act.”). The museum 
retrospective of an artist or catalogue raisonne exemplify this approach. 
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dissimilar to that undertaken by a museum of contemporary 
art.140  However, as a federal statute with mandates and 
penalties, VARA raises the stakes, translating aesthetics into 
law.141  Moreover, unlike a museum, its actual space is relatively 
unbounded and its cultural authority negligible. 
This section charts the conflicts prompted by objects whose 
cultural meaning resides in the interstices of physical and 
intellectual property.  This section also examines the legally and 
art historically fraught enterprise of VARA’s implied material 
hierarchy. 
1. VARA’s Material World 
Although courts systematically reiterate the lofty rhetoric of 
the artist’s spirit and honor culled from VARA’s legislative 
history,142 the tangible object is usually dispositive of the claim.  
Many cases do not survive the threshold assessment of whether 
the subject constitutes a work of art under VARA’s definition,143 
 
140 Gertrude Stein famously considered this brand of museum impossible. See 
Bruce Altshuler, Collecting the New: A Historical Introduction, in COLLECTING THE 
NEW 1, 1 (Bruce Altshuler ed., 2007). 
141 I would distinguish the kind of “aesthetic justice” implicit in the museum 
institution. See Robert Storr, To Have and To Hold, in COLLECTING THE NEW, supra 
note 140, at 29, 39–40 (likening museum acquisition process to courtroom). 
142 See, e.g., Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 
F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 133 
(1st Cir. 2006) (“The theory of moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic 
worth and honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”) 
(citations omitted); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing moral rights 
as “rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature [that] . . . spring from a 
belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work”). 
143 E.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding art 
work consisting of a living garden was not protectable under VARA because it lacked 
fixity required for copyright protection), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011); Nat’l 
Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. (NASCAR) v. Scharle, 184 F. App’x 270, 276 
(3d Cir. 2006) (finding plaintiff’s drawings for NASCAR trophy did not meet VARA 
definition because they did not exist in a single copy or as limited edition, or 
alternatively because they were technical drawings); Phillips, 459 F.3d at 143 
(holding VARA’s definition of art does not include site-specific works of art); Pollara 
v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding mural did not meet VARA’s 
definition of art because it was promotional in nature); Carter, 71 F.3d at 88 (holding 
that sculpture constituted work made for hire and therefore did not meet VARA’s 
definition of a work of art); Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 
(D.P.R. 2007) (finding neither architectural plans nor designs embodied in the 
building were within VARA’s definition of art); Lilley, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 88–89 
(finding photographic prints were not art under VARA because they were not 
produced exclusively for exhibition purposes); Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F. 
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which courts have interpreted narrowly.  VARA case law 
frequently appears less concerned with authorship than artifact 
taxonomy. 
VARA’s answer to the philosophical query “what is art?” is a 
classification scheme principally organized by physical medium 
and traditional qualities of uniqueness and rarity.  VARA 
incorporates a particular idea about the role of art in certain 
purpose-based requirements, such as the photograph “produced 
for exhibition purposes only,” or the advertising exclusion.  The 
limited edition Trois Femmes lithograph in the Picasso example 
suggests the prototypical unique, autonomous object created for 
the aesthetic “use” of hanging on a wall.  But VARA objects, at 
least in the published case law, look different.  They are, for 
example, less autonomous from their environments, physically or 
conceptually or both.144  And they are typically large-scale,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supp. 2d 216, 221–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding posters excluded from VARA’s 
definition of art); see also Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 329 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (finding wrecked, painted automobile used as cactus planter to be 
symbolic of store’s corporate image and therefore promotional in nature, outside 
VARA’s protection); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting 
in dicta that note cards and lithographs existed neither as single copies nor signed 
limited editions, precluding applicability of VARA); Cheffins v. Stewart, No. 3:09-
CV-00130-RAM, 2011 WL 1233378 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2011) (work in which façade of 
sixteenth-century Spanish galleon was wrapped around school bus constituted 
applied art, precluded from VARA’s embrace by definition). 
144 See, e.g., Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291 (two football-field sized gardens in public 
space); Phillips, 459 F.3d at 130 (public sculpture park); Carter, 71 F.3d at 80 
(sculpture built into lobby of building); Hunter v. Squirrel Hill Assocs., 413 F. Supp. 
2d 517, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (mural on exterior of building); Bd. of Managers of Soho 
Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (mural on exterior of building); Hanrahan v. Ramirez, 
No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998) 
(outdoor mural); English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 
WL 746444, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (five murals on outside of buildings plus 
garden sculptures), aff’d, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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designed for an outdoor, public or quasi-public, venue.145  They 
are made from non-traditional materials, not exclusively 
controlled by the artist’s hand.146 
Part of this rift arises from the law’s cultural lag.  Although 
VARA is associated with the Romantic author, Anne Barron, who 
has persuasively argued that the type of object implicated in a 
taxonomy of aesthetic species or types looks more like a product 
of modernism than romanticism: “stable, fixed, closed, self-
contained, and autonomous of its context and audience.”147  The 
modernist sensibility became the target of assault in the 1960s, 
by artists selecting time-sensitive or ephemeral materials, 
performance art, conceptual art, deliberate destruction, and art 
dependent on its environment.148  Many of these postmodern 
tendencies, particularly “anti-art” practices and ideas of 
collective authorship, were discussed by Professor Adler, who 
defied the scholarly crusade for greater moral rights by arguing 
that moral rights law “protects and reifies a notion of art that is 
dead.”149 
Professor Adler’s argument accurately reflects one version of 
art history, in which “art” died in the 1960s, having exhausted its 
aesthetic potential.150  This Article accounts for art’s afterlife.  
That is, while the materials and events encompassed as “art” 
have expanded since the era of historical modernism, the core 
 
145 All of the above examples could be recited here. In addition, see Pollara, 344 
F.3d at 266 (10 by 30-foot banner); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 
(7th Cir. 1999) (large outdoor stainless steel sculpture); Jackson v. Curators of Univ. 
of Mo., No. 11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2011 WL 5838432 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2011) (glass-
tiled mosaic on campus grounds), vacated, No. 11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2012 WL 
3166654 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 2012); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 396–97 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (40 by 10-foot steel sculpture of a swan weighing 6,000 pounds). The 
public nature of most disputed works suggests that audience is both an important 
stake in and perhaps a triggering feature of many VARA conflicts; in terms of 
reputation, the artist has more to gain by bringing suit than with an object tucked 
away in a private home, and also has more to lose. 
146 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291 (work comprised of wildflower gardens); Büchel, 593 
F.3d at 65–66 (large-scale installation comprised of found objects by off-site 
instruction of artist). 
147 Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368, 
370 (2002). 
148 See generally THOMAS CROW, THE RISE OF THE SIXTIES: AMERICAN AND 
EUROPEAN ART IN THE ERA OF DISSENT (2005). 
149 Adler, supra note 10. 
150 See ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART: CONTEMPORARY ART AND 
THE PALE OF HISTORY 21 (1999) (arguing that modernism reached a historical 
closure, after which art became “post-historical” or philosophy). 
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notion of “art” in the broad sense of visual and intellectual 
creation continues evolving.151  Further, although formerly 
reliable demarcations have dissolved,152 a societal matrix 
comprised of creators, museums, collectors, conservators, critics, 
and audiences continue to recognize a distinction between art 
and non-art, just not necessarily with uniformity either within or 
among these groups.153  Thus, while Professor Adler views the 
law in its collision154 with contemporary art, this Article presents 
its entanglement and the resulting chaos of meanings.  
Although unique objects persist as art today, VARA’s status 
as copyright law has been strained by their sheer physical size.  
If intellectual property law has been challenged by public 
ambivalence in recognizing property boundaries that exist only in 
law, e.g., illegal downloads of music,155 VARA cases exacerbate an 
already counterintuitive proposition.  It asks the owner not just 
to observe an invisible legal boundary, but to affirmatively 
disregard the exclusive rights that typically flow from a valid  
 
 
 
151 My view is thus consistent with developments other than conceptual art or 
“anti-art,” including those arising from the availability of electronic media, which 
have influenced artistic practices since VARA’s enactment in 1990. Peter Yu has, in 
this light, appropriately differentiated between the obsolescence of VARA’s object-
oriented approach in the online world and moral rights “as an institution.” See Yu, 
supra note 77, at 17. 
152 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 377, 402 (2007) (“[P]ostmodernism repeatedly questions the clean, reassuring 
divisions of modernism.”); see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. 
REV. 805, 814 (2005) (“Certain current art practice is about breaking down the doors 
of art’s exalted cloister and exploding the definition of art, especially definitions that 
envision a narrow ‘high’ art.”). Contemporary art has also challenged museum 
curators and art conservators. See Graham Larkin, Things Fall Apart, ARTFORUM, 
Apr. 2008, at 153, 156 (“Good luck trying to acquire, store, or present vintage 
performance art, environmental art, Conceptual art, or appropriation art while 
maintaining a clear distinction between art and context, art and life, art and 
artifact, art and interpretation, high and low, original and copy, or completion and 
incompletion.”). 
153 That artists continue to produce paintings suggests a non-linear progression. 
154 Adler, supra note 10 (“[T]he law is on a collision course with the very art it 
seeks to defend.”). 
155 See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 793, 801–02 (2001) (discussing public resistance to recognizing intangible 
products as property); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 891 (2011) (discussing efforts by motion picture and 
recording industries to frame file sharing as theft through analogies to stealing 
tangible property like cars). 
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sale and lawful possession of the material object.  When that 
object is massive, VARA potentially imperils real property 
ownership.156 
The potential to burden real property increases when the 
object’s meaning is contingent on its immediate environment, as 
with site-specific art.  Site-specific work poses a formidable 
challenge to VARA from a property perspective,157 and art 
historically, because it rejects autonomy, a condition of 
modernism.158  The First Circuit, confronted with changes made 
to a public sculpture park, categorically excluded site-specific 
work from VARA’s purview.159  To achieve this result, the court 
considered real property interests, but struggled in reaching a 
rationale that comported with the statute’s goals, incongruously 
explaining that its holding “[did] not denigrate the value or 
importance of site-specific art, which unmistakably enriches our 
culture and the beauty of our public spaces.”160  If one primary 
goal of VARA is to preserve art as a cultural and aesthetic good, 
however, then the court denigrated the value of site-specific art.  
This Article’s point is not to weigh art’s value against real 
property, but to reveal the hierarchy that becomes 
institutionalized under VARA and its potential asynchrony with 
cultural values.  
A more recent case pressed further, challenging not only 
spatial impact but the kind of materials that may constitute an 
art object:  The piece was comprised of two flower beds, each 
nearly the size of a football field, situated in downtown 
Chicago.161  The district court found that artist Chapman Kelley’s 
 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 144–145. As Patty Gerstenblith aptly 
projected, “[I]n a case of a conflict between the artist’s rights and the rights of a real 
property owner, the latter will still receive greater protection.” Gerstenblith, supra 
note 130, at 454. 
157 Francesca Garson, Note, Before that Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: 
The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 205 (2001) (describing the notion that an object could hijack 
the property on which it stands as “Congress’ worst nightmare”). 
158 See Barron, supra note 147. 
159 Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 131, 142–43 (1st Cir. 
2006); cf. Hughes, supra note 114, at 25 (“The popular belief that there is a strong 
boundary between work and framework is apparent in the provisions of the VARA.”). 
160 Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142–43. 
161 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 29, 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011). 
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work qualified as a “painting” or “sculpture” under VARA’s 
definition, but was not copyrightable because it was not 
sufficiently “original.”162  Alternately, the court found that the 
work was not protected under VARA following the First Circuit’s 
logic:  Because it was site-specific.163  On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit found the work sufficiently original for copyright 
purposes and declined to adopt a categorical exclusion of site-
specific work from VARA; however, the circuit court rejected 
Wildflower Works from VARA’s scope because it lacked the fixity 
and authorship requirements of copyright.164  While 
acknowledging that “the artistic community might classify 
Kelley’s garden as a work of postmodern conceptual art,”165 the 
circuit court found it was “quintessentially a garden,” and thus 
not copyrightable.166 
Importantly, the circuit court also cast doubt on the district 
court’s conclusion that Wildflower Works was a “painting” or 
“sculpture” under VARA—a finding that it noted, with 
incredulity, the defendant had not challenged on appeal.167  The 
circuit court underscored VARA’s limiting purpose with respect 
to section 102(a)(5) of the Copyright Act, which uses adjectives 
like “pictorial” and “sculptural” that “suggest[] flexibility and 
breadth in application.”168  In contrast, VARA’s definition, relying 
on “nouns,” requires that the work “must actually be a ‘painting’ 
or a ‘sculpture.’  Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really.”169  
In the circuit court’s aggressively literal interpretation, which 
explicitly discounted the artist’s intent, an art historian’s  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Id. at *6 (“Kelley leaves this Court to assume that he is the first person to 
ever conceive of and express an arrangement of growing wildflowers in ellipse-
shaped enclosed area in the manner in which he created his exhibit.”). 
163 Id. at *6–7. 
164 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 302–03, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2011). 
165 Id. at 304. 
166 Id. at 306. 
167 Id. at 300 (“This is an astonishing omission.”). 
168 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006)). 
169 Id. (citing the 17 U.S.C. § 101 definition of a “work of visual art”). 
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testimony, and the defendant’s own marketing of the piece as 
“living art,”170 the circuit court relied only on a dictionary 
defining the terms “painting” and “sculpture.”171 
2. Art, by Authority of Law 
As theorized by Professors Merryman and Sax, the moral 
rights doctrine tracks, and even serves, art history.  America’s 
artistic success justified artists’ rights that would likewise 
protect significant art.  Both the Kelley and Phillips courts, 
however, interpreted VARA as a more autonomous project, 
expressing fidelity to legal norms or rigid definitions that conflict 
with how the art community might value a given work. 
This is a significant problem for VARA’s preservation 
agenda.  Indeed, the domains of law and art history cannot be 
disentangled in VARA case law because the statute is predicated 
on an eminently art historical act: the determination of whether 
an object receives protection that supersedes the owner’s 
discretion because it is classifiable as art.  VARA’s most basic 
inquiry thus affronts a prominent copyright law taboo, what 
Christine Haight Farley calls the “doctrine of avoidance” of 
rendering artistic determinations,172 inspired by Holmes’s 
admonition that entertaining the merits of art is a “dangerous 
undertaking.”173 
 
170 The court found the artist’s intent not dispositive and appeared to concur 
with the district court that the artist’s expert (an art historian) was unhelpful. It 
further stated that the defendant’s marketing of the piece as “living art” “add[ed] 
little to the analysis.” Id. at 300–01. 
171 Id. at 301 n.7. The court acknowledged the lower court’s regard for the 
“tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or avant garden art,” 
but concluded, “there’s a big difference between avoiding a literalistic approach and 
embracing one that is infinitely malleable.” The court aligned the district court’s 
decision with the latter. Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172 Farley, supra note 152, at 815. 
173 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The 
passage reads: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of 
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them 
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author 
spoke.” Id. In deference to this famous warning, VARA opinions are occasionally 
accompanied by disclaimers. See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“We steer clear of an interpretation of VARA that would require courts to 
assess either the worth of a purported work of visual art, or the worth of the purpose 
for which the work was created.”); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to be to 
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Although commentators have typically focused on the 
“recognized stature” requirement in VARA’s anti-destruction 
provision as the ignominious path to qualitative assessments of 
art by judges, this Article argues, consistent with Professor 
Farley’s analysis, that the liminal definition of a “work of visual 
art” is equally qualitative.174  To identify an object as “art” 
presupposes a particular meaning and value; “not art” suggests 
their absence.  VARA is a unique site for this nexus of law and 
art because an artistic determination is not simply required to 
enforce a right, but is the reason for the right. 
Evaluation inheres in classification because the designation 
“art” is historically and socially informed.  For example, even the 
simple bifurcation in the First Circuit’s site-specific 
designation—that some works derive meaning from their 
environment, while others are immune and purely self-
contained—elides a more complex process of how artistic 
meaning is generated.  According to the Phillips court: 
A simple example of a work of integrated art that is not site-
specific is Marcel Duchamp’s work ‘Bicycle Wheel’, a sculpture 
integrating a bicycle fork, a bicycle wheel, and a stool in a 
particular arrangement.  However, this sculpture does not 
integrate its location and could be part of a traveling exhibition 
of Duchamp’s work without losing its artistic meaning or being 
destroyed.175 
By explaining site-specific as a function of immobility, the 
court overlooks the fact that Duchamp’s readymades were 
entirely context-dependent when first introduced.  Duchamp 
deliberately selected commonly recognized objects to make the  
 
 
 
 
decide this case.”); id. at 615 (Manion, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Like my colleagues, I am not an art critic. So I begin with the well-worn 
adage that one man’s junk is another man’s treasure.”); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 
Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[C]ourts have persistently shunned the 
role of art critic.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). But cf. 
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
249–50 (1998) (arguing that the distinction between judicial reasoning and aesthetic 
reasoning is illusory). 
174 See Farley, supra note 152, at 820–21. 
175 Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 140 n.9 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(citations omitted). 
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point that the only distinction from their ordinary status 
occurred by placement in the sacred realm of the museum.176  It 
was not a matter of scale and physical mobility. 
The readymade revealed that the seemingly neutral museum 
was itself a value-charged environment infused with a coded 
command that the objects contained within be revered as art.  
The First Circuit’s classification stumbles on a similarly 
presumed neutrality—relying on an art historical canon that 
commands works by Duchamp constitute art—and again 
demonstrates the inherently historical contingency of an 
“objective” taxonomy.177 
Legislators provided a liberal means of responding to 
VARA’s threshold query by advising courts to “use common sense 
and generally accepted standards of the artistic community in 
determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of 
the definition.”178  However, problems arise in the conflict 
between these two sources, common sense and generally accepted 
standards, as when the Seventh Circuit preferred the former, 
severing artistic community standards from its assessment that 
Wildflower Works constituted neither a painting nor a 
sculpture.179  An analogous appeal to common sense occurred 
when the Second Circuit rejected a large mural from VARA’s 
embrace pursuant to the advertising exclusion, based on the 
work’s “objective and evident purpose.”180  Ironically, in Bleistein, 
the court found that a picture used for advertising should receive 
the same copyright protection as “fine art.”  The opinion 
expressed concern that judges might exclude advertisements 
 
176 See MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART 
70–71 (2003). 
177 The misalignment of conceptual art and copyright law has received increased 
attention in recent years. See Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and 
Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 212, 214 (2010) 
(arguing that conceptual art should be categorically excluded from copyright 
protection). 
178 Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Flack v. Friends of Queen 
Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
179 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 380 (2011) (“We fully accept that the artistic community might classify 
Kelley’s garden as a work of postmodern conceptual art.”). 
180 Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269. 
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based on elitist privileging of the fine arts,181 the very distinction 
enshrined in VARA.  In this respect, VARA refutes Bleistein; it 
demands that courts privilege fine art above other visual 
expression. 
How do we reconcile these competing policies within 
copyright law?  By copyright standards, VARA is exclusionary.  
But if VARA’s purpose is to privilege a higher order of objects, as 
suggested in Merryman’s cultural evolution theory of moral 
rights,182 then the statute is overinclusive and irrationally 
dictated by medium and convention.  As the category of “art” has 
widened its embrace to forms of popular culture,183 what was 
previously considered “kitsch”184 has expanded to include the 
material species that once signified high art.  Consider one art 
critic’s review of a portrait of Bill and Melinda Gates, in a column 
tellingly entitled, “Is This Art?”185  The painting reflects an 
inveterate art form—portraiture—in a traditional medium, oil on 
canvas.  It would certainly meet the Seventh Circuit’s terse 
definition of the “noun” painting.  Yet critic Blake Gopnik cannot 
imagine the work having a place in “any . . . serious art 
institution”—not because of mediocre quality, but because the 
portrait “isn’t functioning as art at all.”186 
A court would easily read the Gates portrait as a “painting,” 
and thus a work of art protectable under VARA.  But reconciling 
this hypothetical outcome with the exclusions imposed by the 
First and Seventh Circuits is troubling.  By sidelining the art 
community in defining art under VARA, Kelley enforced a 
doctrinal schism that frustrates the statute’s purpose.  This is 
 
181 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“A 
picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright, that it is 
used for an advertisement.”). 
182 See generally supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
183 See, e.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc., v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing litigation based on artist Jeff Koons’s use of cartoon 
character “Odie” as the premise for a sculpture). 
184 See, e.g., CLEMENT GREENBERG, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND 
CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 70, at 3, 9–21. 
185 Blake Gopnik, Is This Art?, DAILY BEAST (May 18, 2011, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/18/bill-and-melinda-gates-portrait-is-
this-art.html. 
186 Id. He compares the work to a driver’s license photograph. However, painting 
as a form is not a reliable indicator of historical anachronism. Figurative painters 
like John Currin and Lisa Yuskavage are highly valued in the contemporary art 
world. 
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not to suggest that courts have erred in their reasoning,187 but to 
point out that in reaching these decisions, they simultaneously 
construct and implement an artistic hierarchy that has 
increasingly deviated from that of the community governed.188  In 
other words, shouldn’t a statute whose goals include preserving 
contemporary art be influenced by current artistic norms? 
B. The Cultural Object 
Just as the concept of art resists definition, so does 
“culture”;189 yet, the relationship between the two was made 
critical to VARA’s preservation agenda.  The vast role into which 
Congress cast VARA’s narrow class of art objects included 
“capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future 
generations.”190  The objects preserved would convey “an accurate 
account of the culture of our time,”191 testify to national 
character, and stand “among the greatest of our national 
treasures.”192 
Conceptualizing VARA as a means of recording American 
history and protecting national treasures, however, contains 
several contestable assumptions, and this Article will mention a 
 
187 The Seventh Circuit, for example, simply adhered to the plain meaning of the 
statute in holding that a work protected under VARA must also be copyrightable. 
While the reasoning by which the court judged the work unfit for copyright 
protection is beyond the scope of this Article, restricting moral rights to 
copyrightable works has not been viewed as particularly controversial. See, e.g., 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality: A Response, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2009) (“I do not believe the best approach is to apply moral 
rights to a wider array of works than are currently covered under copyright law.”). 
188 But see Brancusi v. United States, T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 428 
(1928), where a Customs Court allowed Brancusi’s Bird in Flight to enter the United 
States as “art,” and thus without a tariff. The court acknowledged that “under the 
earlier decisions this importation would have been rejected as a work of art,” but 
deferred to the art world’s embrace of modernism and stated: “Whether or not we are 
in sympathy with these newer ideas and the schools which represent them, we think 
the fact of their existence and their influence upon the art world as recognized by 
the courts must be considered.” Id. at 430–31. 
189 For discussions on culture as an analytic framework of which the law is 
constitutive, rather than autonomous from, see generally Paul W. Kahn, Freedom, 
Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141 (2001); 
Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839 
(2011); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2001). 
190 135 CONG. REC. 12,622 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
191 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 125 (1990) (statement of Weltzin Blix). 
192 Id. at 117 (statement of Arnold L. Lehman). 
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few.  First, it assumes that the class of objects defined under 
VARA reflects contemporary art, and moreover great art—
connections that, as shown in the previous section, courts have 
repudiated.  Second, it assumes that contemporary art objects 
embody American culture—an assumption that many would find 
incongruous with the notion of an art world as a discrete, insular, 
and sometimes elitist segment of this nation’s culture.  Third, it 
assumes that art preservation inures to the public good—an 
assumption whose limitations and political mediations became 
apparent in an array of historic clashes.  This section deals with 
the latter two assumptions, canvassing the conflicts precipitated 
by a statute aimed at protecting American culture. 
1. Cultural Records and National Treasures 
“There is truth in objects.”193 
While VARA defines art in its text, its conception of culture 
is more implicit.  Under VARA, culture is reified, condensed into 
a type of object—a philosophy that again strikes a musicological 
chord and invokes cultural property theory.  The notion of 
recording American culture by protecting objects in their 
“authentic” form, for the benefit of the public, sounds not unlike 
the theme of a museum fundraiser, especially one offering an 
encyclopedic unfolding of history.194  The quote from Merryman 
about objects as truth posits “art” as inclusive of artifacts, a 
vision of human culture reflected in art and archeological 
museum collections, where objects are preserved as vestiges of 
bygone civilizations.195  Under an object-based mode of 
 
193 Merryman, The Public Interest, supra note 66, at 346. 
194 Conservation has traditionally been viewed as one fundamental purpose of a 
museum. The language below parallels themes in VARA’s legislative history: 
“Cultural property consists of individual objects, structures, or aggregate collections. 
It is material which has significance that may be artistic, historical, scientific, 
religious, or social, and it is an invaluable and irreplaceable legacy that must be 
preserved for future generations.” AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONSERVATION, 
Preamble, CODE OF ETHICS AND GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE 283 (1994), available at 
http://www.conservation-us.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PageID=858& 
d:%5CCFusionMX7%5Cverity%5CData%5Cdummy.txt. 
195 See Merryman, The Public Interest, supra note 66, at 346 (referring to work 
produced by “the artist or artisan”). The practice of conserving cultural objects in 
museums has been applied, much more controversially, to living cultures. See 
generally 3 OBJECTS AND OTHERS: ESSAYS ON MUSEUMS AND MATERIAL CULTURE 
(George W. Stocking, Jr. ed., 1985); EXHIBITING CULTURES: THE POETICS AND 
POLITICS OF MUSEUM DISPLAY (Ivan Karp & Steven D. Lavine eds., 1991); JAMES 
CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, 
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ascertaining knowledge about culture, the objects are isolated 
repositories of a definite truth that can be discovered and 
communicated to the viewer.196  For all its limitations, this 
archeological approach encompasses manifold associations, e.g., 
ritual, religious, and functional, in addition to the Western 
construct of high art rooted in eighteenth-century Europe.197 
With VARA, the meaning of the objects identified is 
prefigured; VARA thus informs and constitutes, rather than 
discovers and reflects, a set of civic values.  Moreover, its 
selection presupposes the broad social relevance of “fine art,” 
under which the exclusive function of the object is to be 
preserved and admired for its aesthetic value.  Under VARA, 
preservation is not merely an outcome, but a prerequisite.198 
In the cultural role invoked by legislators, VARA’s objects 
are also national treasures because they reflect the highest 
achievements of genius within a universal aesthetic norm—
modernism’s distinguishing feature.  Moral rights scholars like 
Merryman discuss great art as if it were the only kind, or at least 
easily ascertainable and susceptible to definition by consensus.199  
It is this notion of art as not merely an object, but an unspoken 
discriminatory standard, that sustains the public interest 
justification of the right to prohibit destruction,200 tacitly 
reinforced in discourse that references the loss of works by  
 
 
LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); SALLY PRICE, PRIMITIVE ART IN CIVILIZED PLACES 
(1989). 
196 See Ian Sutherland & Sophia Krzys Acord, Thinking with Art: From Situated 
Knowledge to Experiential Knowing, 6 J. VISUAL ART PRAC. 125, 133 (2007) 
(discussing the limitations of objects as sources of “objective” knowledge). 
197 See generally MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: 
REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (Jonathan Arac ed., 1994) (providing 
history of modern conception of the arts). 
198 The district court in Pollara demonstrated this circularity by requiring the 
manifest intent that the object was created to be preserved, rather than used for 
advertising, as a threshold. See Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336–37 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003). According to the court, a contrary 
result “would not advance the values protected by VARA.” Id. at 337 n.6. 
199 A more utopian view suggests that all art should be preserved. See Liemer, 
supra note 10, at 51 (arguing that right of integrity “avoids value judgments” as to 
quality because a “society that recognizes this right recognizes the value of all 
creative efforts”). Both rhetorical stances avoid uncomfortable line-drawing because 
they frame the doctrine solely in terms of whether “art,” as an undifferentiated 
category, is valued by society. 
200 Id. at 52 (describing how unless destruction is prohibited, “[t]he public’s 
interest in the work also goes unprotected”). 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
88 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:47   
renowned artists like Picasso.  These views implicitly deny the 
influence of culture in determining, as opposed to merely 
reflecting, the winners.201 
The “recognized stature” standard in the anti-destruction 
provision is VARA’s proxy for national treasures, i.e., high 
cultural value.  Although recognized stature has been criticized 
for obstructing a broader allocation of moral rights,202 the more 
telling cultural exclusions occur earlier, in the objects that fail to 
qualify for consideration: not just advertising, but popular forms 
of entertainment like motion pictures and videographic 
expression.203  Mass media and mass culture—emblematic 
attributes of American identity—were excised from VARA’s 
embrace, rendering high culture as the sole exponent of national 
heritage.  Ultimately, VARA does not necessarily protect artifacts 
that signify or embody culture.  Rather, it protects a class of 
objects that fit a prescribed cultural role. 
 
201 See, e.g., LINDA NOCHLIN, Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?, in 
WOMEN, ART, AND POWER 145, 152–55 (1988) (pointing out latent cultural biases 
that inhere in professional norms, including conception of “Great Artist”). Trends are 
one indication of cultural influences. See, e.g., Storr, supra note 141, at 31 (noting 
arc of burgeoning interest in Frieda Kahlo in 1930s, slump in 1950s and 60s, and 
now exorbitant prices); Jeffrey Weiss, 9 Minutes 45 Seconds, in COLLECTING THE 
NEW, supra note 140, at 41, 45 (acknowledging political incentives in National 
Gallery’s efforts to collect Abstract Expressionism in the 1970s and 80s); Georgina 
Adam, The Lure of the East, ART NEWSPAPER, Jan. 2011, at 31, 31 (noting recent 
revival of interest in nineteenth-century Orientalism, following period of political 
incorrectness). 
202 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1964, 1971 (proposing removal of recognized 
stature requirement). Contrary to this theory, courts have shown some willingness 
to apply the standard flexibly—a willingness that suggests a desire to translate the 
idea of art into values that resonate with a broader theory of culture. E.g., Hanrahan 
v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 
1998) (finding mural painted by artist and 300 kids from economically depressed, 
racially diverse area had recognized stature, and finding harm to the artist’s 
reputation “as one who can make this kind of community project work”); Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing deference to “art 
experts, the art community, or society in general”); cf. Robinson, supra note 8, at 
1959–61 (noting frequency of litigation over murals valued in California Chicano 
communities since VARA). 
203 I refer to cultural products that have some visual component, and thus 
exclude other copyrightable expressions arguably more associated with American 
culture, like certain musical genres. 
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2. The Politics of Preservation 
“The integrity right helps preserve artworks intact for all of us 
to enjoy.”204 
This section probes the conflicting impulses that belie the 
monolithic cultural role assigned by VARA to art objects, wherein 
art preservation is always a public benefit and an overture of 
social harmony.205 
a. The Imperfect Moment 
As discussed, VARA’s taxonomy recalls modernism by 
implying the object’s autonomous, self-contained aesthetic 
existence.  Professor Sax, arguing for greater regulation and 
protection of cultural treasures, similarly views recognition of the 
art object’s intrinsic aesthetic value critical to cultural 
preservation policy because it supersedes the political or religious 
purpose that might trigger the object’s iconoclastic demise.  
According to Professor Sax, the aesthetic priority represents “the 
great triumph of the decontextualization of art.”206 
To illustrate, he relays an incident from the 1930s, when the 
Rockefellers discovered that Diego Rivera’s mural, commissioned 
for an entranceway in Rockefeller Center, included a portrait of 
Lenin.  To their request that he paint over Lenin’s face, Rivera 
responded that he would prefer destruction of the work in its 
entirety.  The Rockefellers, after paying Rivera in full, had the 
mural destroyed, an act which Rivera called “cultural 
vandalism.”  According to Professor Sax, “The Rockefellers can 
only be seen as ‘cultural vandals’ if the community’s interest in 
preserving the achievements of genius is understood to be more  
 
 
204 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 82 (1990) (statement of Prof. Jane Ginsburg). 
205 See, e.g., Liemer, supra note 10, at 56–57 (“Experiencing others’ art gives a 
greater sense of the other and often facilitates an understanding of and sensitivity to 
those who view the world differently.”); Ong, supra note 9, at 309 (“[T]he 
communicative function that the integrity right serves towards the cultivation of a 
tolerant, respectful and culturally enlightened community.”). 
206 SAX, supra note 56, at 18. Justin Hughes assumes the modernist approach by 
suggesting that western art has been characterized by a progression toward 
decontextualization, beginning with context-dependent religious art and leading to 
modern art, film, and the internet. Hughes, supra note 114, at 25 (“All of these social 
and artistic developments have given rise to a popular belief that a work, by itself, 
embodies meaning.”). 
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important than its role in advancing the political or religious 
agenda of the owner or patron.”207  That, he says, is the position 
taken by “the modern world.”208 
It is probably fairer to state that modern America has taken 
this position with historical hindsight.209  Although certainly the 
destruction of Rivera’s mural was tragic, Professor Sax’s view is 
facilitated by the neutralizing power of historical distance, both 
in terms of a changed political environment and retrospective 
consensus as to Rivera’s contribution to art history.210  Important 
interests, including those implied by Rivera’s reaction, seem 
compromised by a theory that renders the Rockefellers 
insufficiently appreciative of the object’s aesthetic value.211 
The impossibility of filtering contemporaneous associations, 
of somehow placing one’s vantage outside of history to appreciate 
an object’s “inherent” aesthetic attributes is exemplified in the 
culture wars of the 1990s, precipitated by the Corcoran Gallery’s 
cancellation of an exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic 
photographs.212  In the context of the visual arts, the culture wars 
also demonstrated that like objects, acts of destruction have an 
expressive value.213  Just one month prior to Representative 
Markey’s pronouncement that works by American artists should 
be preserved because they capture and record “the essence of 
culture.”214  Senator Alphonse D’Amato famously tore up a copy 
 
207 SAX, supra note 56, at 17–18. 
208 Id. at 18. 
209 Some would argue that this view has also justified a colonialist approach to 
non-Western property because it denies meanings invested by the source culture. 
See Patricia Failing, The Case of Dismembered Masterpieces, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1980, 
at 68 (noting that practice of breaking up and decontextualizing objects is often 
associated with the importation of cultural artifacts from Third World countries). 
210 As Professor Mezey has observed with respect to the broader realm of 
cultural property, “[p]reservationism, for all its importance, values stasis, and 
therefore is much better suited to dead cultures than to living ones.” Mezey, supra 
note 62, at 2013. 
211 Prior to having the mural destroyed, Nelson Rockefeller attempted to donate 
it to the Museum of Modern Art, but this plan was rejected by the museum’s 
trustees. See SAX, supra note 56, at 14–15. 
212 The Corcoran Gallery had agreed to host an exhibition of the artist’s 
photographs, The Perfect Moment. Upon learning that the exhibition included 
explicit, homoerotic works, and two images of naked children, it canceled. The 
Washington Project for the Arts ultimately displayed the images, to huge crowds, 
from July 21 to August 18, 1989. 
213 For an interesting discussion on the expressive value of destruction, see Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 824–30 (2005). 
214 135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
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of Andres Serrano’s controversial work, Piss Christ, on the floor 
of the Senate.215  D’Amato’s gesture offers a potent counter-
symbolism to the Trois Femmes incident.  Moreover, the former—
targeting work by an American artist—is arguably more 
representative of our national culture in the 1990s, one 
characterized by dissent and discomfort with a diverse cultural 
landscape.  The juxtaposition of VARA’s enactment with this 
milieu reveals a more oppositional stance with culture than 
anticipated. 
b. The Democracy of Destruction 
“This is a day for the people to rejoice, because now the plaza 
returns rightfully to the people.”216 
An art object need not manifest a socially divisive message 
for art preservation to assume a political character.  This is 
partly because contemporary art is not just another category of 
American artifacts, alongside historical monuments like the 
Liberty Bell; it is a league often perceived as un-American and 
elitist.  While museums have long contended with the gap 
between contemporary art and a broad public audience,217 
VARA’s public is involuntary. 
Although it has been repeatedly dissected in law and art 
historical literature, the highly publicized, pre-VARA controversy 
in 1986, involving Richard Serra and his seventy-three-ton steel 
“anti-monument,” Tilted Arc, remains a compelling illustration of 
the intense hostility that can mount over a public art work 
absent overt political content.  It depicts the more extreme ends 
 
215 D’Amato’s conduct occurred on May 18, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. S5594 (daily 
ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. D’Amato); Andres Serrano: Piss Christ, 
CHRISTIE’S AUCTION HOUSE, http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot_details.aspx?int 
ObjectID=5070403 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
216 William Diamond, regional administrator of the federal government’s Art-in-
Architecture Program, speaking on the day that Richard Serra’s commissioned 
abstract sculpture, Tilted Arc, was removed from New York’s Federal Plaza. 
Maquette for Titled Arc, SMITHSONIAN AMERICAN ART MUSEUM AND THE RENWICK 
GALLERY, http://americanart.si.edu/collections/search/artwork/?id=22145 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
217 See generally Carl Andre et al., The Role of the Artist in Today’s Society, 34 
ART J. 327 (1975) (discussing museum symposium addressing gap between art and 
public). Modern museum audiences in the United States typically consist of persons 
with high levels of formal education. Kreidler, supra note 39, at 157 (“This point has 
been confirmed by virtually all surveys of performing arts and museum audiences 
over the past three decades.”). 
FINAL_BONNEAU 12/11/2013 3:26 PM 
92 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:47   
of how a seemingly neutral, literally conservative, decision to 
preserve can ignite latent tensions between the artistic 
community and the public. 
In brief, Serra had been commissioned by the General 
Services Administration (“GSA”) of the federal government to 
design a sculpture under its Art-in-Architecture program.218  
Serra’s massive, site-specific arc219 was installed at the center of 
Federal Plaza and greeted with immediate hostility by employees 
who demanded its removal.220  When GSA offered to move the 
work to a new venue, Serra claimed that relocation was 
tantamount to destruction and brought suit.221  Spectators 
described the hearings as an intensely antagonistic confrontation 
between an elitist art world and “the people.”222  In the end, 
Tilted Arc was destroyed. 
Although the quote above indicates that “the people” won, 
Tilted Arc, like most public sculpture, was defended on grounds 
of democracy and public access.223  Which public represents 
American culture, when, and for how long?  The final irony of 
Tilted Arc is that although it was destroyed decades ago, we still  
 
 
 
 
 
218 For a detailed discussion of GSA’s Art-in-Architecture program—whose 
policy rationale was exclusively aesthetic enrichment—and comparison with other 
federal arts programs, see Judith Huggins Balfe, The Process of Commissioning 
Public Sculpture: “Due” or “Duel”, in AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO CULTURE: 
GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS, supra note 44, at 189, 189–204. 
219 Unlike site-specific art that attempted to complement its environment, 
Serra’s arc reflected his ambition that the site “be understood primarily as a 
function of the sculpture.” Thomas Crow, Site-Specific Art: The Strong and the Weak, 
in MODERN ART IN THE COMMON CULTURE 131, 146 (1996) (quoting Richard Serra). 
220 See Robert Storr, “Tilted Arc”: Enemy of the People?, ART IN AMERICA, Sept. 
1980, at 91, 91–92. 
221 Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 
aff’d, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). 
222 See Crow, supra note 219, at 148–50; cf. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 
847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[Tilted Arc] is now coated with what the artist 
refers to as ‘a golden amber patina’ and what the sculpture's critics refer to as 
‘rust.’ ”). 
223 The dismemberment of art has likewise been defended on grounds of cultural 
democracy, at least with respect to non-Western art. See, e.g., Michael Kimmelman, 
Who Draws the Borders of Culture?, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at AR1 (arguing that 
the “countless altars and other works of art [that] have been split up and dispersed 
among private collectors and museums here and there” has been “democratizing”). 
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talk about it, in law and in art history.  Tilted Arc, probably 
Serra’s best known sculpture, derived monumental, enduring 
power from and in its absence.224 
The examples provided ultimately speak neither for the 
public benefit of preservation nor that of destruction.  Rather, 
they signify the mutability and variance of symbolism associated 
with art objects, and they highlight that the modern approach to 
preservation implicit in VARA is not simply a means of 
protecting culture but a distinct cultural value in itself. 
C. The Transcendent Object 
“I wish I was a hedge fund manager.  Or at least I wish I knew 
what hedge fund managers do.”225 
“They collect art.”226 
This section looks at the consequences of investing an object 
with transcendence, that is, valuing it as something other than a 
commodity, as theorized under VARA’s right of integrity.  Under 
VARA, the anti-commodity status of art is intimately connected 
to the Romantic author archetype and the creative act.227  But the 
transcendent object is also a social role with remarkable traction:  
Objects may be deemed “priceless” or universalized as belonging 
to no one,228 even though we know that works sell at auction and 
have owners.  This section examines the implications of these 
conflicting meanings for the moral rights doctrine and for its 
relation to copyright law and considers how destruction fits into 
this picture. 
 
224 See Crow, supra note 219, at 150 (arguing that Tilted Arc controversy, as 
opposed to the object, instigated important debates that “might have been 
complacently put aside had it gone on existing.”). 
225 GEOFF DYER, JEFF IN VENICE, DEATH IN VARANASI 89 (2009). 
226 Id. 
227 Moral rights theory suggests that the object is almost a living thing, like a 
child. KWALL, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing parental metaphor as reflecting 
intrinsic dimension of creativity); Adler, supra note 10, at 269; see also Deborah 
Solomon, Our Most Notorious Sculptor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, § 6, at 39 
(reporting that Serra and his wife speak of Tilted Arc “as if it were a child they 
lost”). 
228 See 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. 
Markey) (“[Works of art] belong to no one because they belong to all of us.”). 
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1. The Moral of Creation 
To justify incorporating moral rights into the Copyright Act, 
VARA’s supporters rendered art preservation utilitarian.  They 
suggested that the climate of respect and honor created by 
preserving contemporary art would motivate further creation, 
analogous to, yet qualitatively distinct from, the economic reward 
presumably inspiring other types of authors.229  This theory relies 
on two false binaries: (1) art versus money and (2) preservation 
versus destruction. 
a. Incentives and Requirements 
In the destruction paradigm based on Picasso’s Trois 
Femmes, the profit-motivated entrepreneur is the bad guy.230  
This seems a remarkable nemesis, especially in the late 1980s.231  
Art has been connected to a market ever since formal patronage 
declined and the dealer system emerged in the nineteenth 
century.  Although this Article shares the opinion that artists are 
not motivated by profits,232 they have long been compelled to 
navigate the mundane business of selling their works.  Indeed, 
the waning reliability of secure commissions and the absence of a 
socially integrated role helped create the conditions that resulted 
in the Romantic author, starving and alone, opposed to banal  
 
 
 
229 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian 
justification for moral rights advanced by legislators). This logic has been 
perpetuated by courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Mass. Museum of 
Contemporary Art Found., Inc., v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(acknowledging one purpose of VARA was to “encourage the creation of . . . [fine] 
art”); Liemer, supra note 10, at 44 (“Recognizing moral rights is one way a society 
can encourage artists to create.”). 
230 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
231 See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. 
Markey) (“[A]rt . . . is more than a piece of property . . . . [I]t is even more than a 
valuable commodity with one of the highest rates of return on the market. Works of 
art are much more than that.”). 
232 KWALL, supra note 7, at 19 (“[C]reativity is spurred largely by incentives that 
are noneconomic in nature.”). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in 
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007) (critiquing both rights-based 
and economic approaches to copyright law as impoverished means of theorizing 
creativity); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (critiquing theory of external 
incentives to creativity). 
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social conventions.233  Although the paradoxical dependency of 
art upon money is everywhere observed, this oppositional trope 
persists.234 
VARA both denies the economic side of art and attempts to 
redress it.  Although moral rights are presented as 
nonpecuniary235 and often discussed in quasi-spiritual terms, 
VARA is also rationalized as a means for visual artists to 
increase bargaining power over purchasers236 and offers money 
damages.237  Recall that the VARA bill was partly defended as a 
means for visual artists—meaning creators of unique objects—to 
obtain parity with other authors better served under the 
copyright model.238  But as a statute that purports to provide only 
noneconomic rights, VARA clashes with, rather than 
supplements, the dominant culture of copyright law.  Although 
copyright law has been criticized for overrelying on economic 
theory,239 the reverse polarization of art and money has also 
frustrated the marriage of moral rights with copyright law; 
instead, VARA assumes the somewhat absurd stance of 
purporting to incentivize transcendence. 
As much as the Picasso paradigm appears to chastise the 
destructive taint of money, its subtext honors the economic value 
of art.  To wit, the Trois Femmes example is effectively devoid of 
an artist; its outrageousness is derived from the loss of an object 
highly valued by the market—due to the artist’s reputation—not 
 
233 See JANET WOLFF, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF ART 10–12 (2d ed. 1993). 
234 See, e.g., David Colman, Rachel Feinstein and John Currin, Their Own Best 
Creations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, ST1 (discussing potential harm to reputation 
and credibility when artists lead relatively glamorous lifestyles). 
235 See Yu, supra note 77, at 20 (“[T]he protection of moral rights is not about 
pecuniary compensation.”); Ong, supra note 9, at 312 (critiquing economic 
justifications of moral rights as counterproductive). 
236 E.g., KWALL, supra note 7, at 33 (altering the bargaining power between 
author and user is “the very purpose of moral rights laws”); Ong, supra note 9, at 
302. 
237 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(noting the court’s reluctance to impose full statutory damages despite violation, 
reasoning that destructive conduct could not have been “wilful,” under 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) because defendant had no knowledge of VARA rights). 
238 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 100 (arguing on economic 
grounds that copyright law already functions like a right of integrity with respect to 
literary works). 
239 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 232, at 517–18 (“What empirical evidence 
exists does not engender confidence that increases in copyright protection spur 
creativity.”). 
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the artist’s diminished dignity.  VARA plaintiffs seek art 
preservation based on the latter, but without the former, the task 
is more arduous. 
b. Preservationism and Destructionism 
Contrary to the model offered by legislators, in which 
preservation begets creation, Amy Adler has argued that VARA 
is harmful to artists because it is based on an outdated 
conception of art that “artists have been rebelling against for the 
last forty years.”240  Preservation, she argues, thwarts destruction 
and thereby stifles creation:  “Inherent in the idea of the avant-
garde, valorized by modernism, is the idea of continually 
breaking with the past.  Modernism depended on shattering 
tradition; the progress of art entailed a kind of metaphorical 
iconoclasm.”241 
Because she views destruction as essential to artistic 
progress, Professor Adler contends that “moral rights laws 
endanger art in the name of protecting it.”242 
One example of the many that Professor Adler uses to 
demonstrate the importance of destruction to creative innovation 
is Erased de Kooning Drawing, from 1953—Rauschenberg’s 
celebrated attack by erasure on a work by the eponymous then-
reigning master of painting and quintessential Abstract 
Expressionist.243  In the view of many, the unknown 
Rauschenberg destroyed de Kooning’s art to advance from the 
oppressive hegemony of Abstract Expressionism.  Adler positions 
Erased de Kooning as a “scandalous assault on a particular 
conception of ‘art,’ ” the one embodied in VARA.244 
In one respect it was, but this Article offers the obvious 
corollary.  Erased de Kooning now hangs in the San Francisco 
Museum of Modern Art and is revered as the very conception of 
“art” that it arguably decimated.  Without discrediting 
Rauschenberg’s personal convictions or the work’s performative 
impact,245 the absorption of the work and the artist into the 
 
240 Adler, supra note 10. 
241 Id. at 265, 288. 
242 Id. at 265. 
243 Id. at 283. Significantly, de Kooning willingly provided the drawing for this 
event. Id. at 283 n.111. 
244 Id. at 283. 
245 Erased de Kooning, while not unimportant, did not single-handedly 
devastate Abstract Expressionism; as with most art historical developments, the 
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established canon bespeaks a cycle rather than an end.  
Rauschenberg may have destroyed de Kooning’s sovereignty, but 
not the kingdom.246 
Rauschenberg is not the only artist to take a counter-cultural 
stance, only to be venerated by the cultural mainstream.247  
While today’s conceptual impulse can be traced to Duchamp, he 
began signing his readymades in the 1960s, acceding to the 
institutional values of rarity, authorship, and authenticity that 
his readymades supposedly mocked.  Defiance of the art 
establishment often generates a notoriety that ultimately 
reaffirms the attacked domain.248  Thus, even as he exposed the 
“white cube,” Duchamp also demonstrated its capacity to absorb 
assault.249  Even today’s artists who work in the conceptual 
tradition of Duchamp are doing just that: perpetuating the 
oxymoron of an “avant garde tradition.”  In sum, rather than 
being incompatible with the Romantic author, the artist-
destroyer epitomizes it. 
 
process eludes definitive boundaries. See, e.g., CROW, supra note 148, at 18–19 
(discussing significance of Jasper Johns’s 1958 exhibition). See generally JOSHUA 
SHANNON, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF OBJECTS: NEW YORK ART AND THE RISE OF THE 
POSTMODERN CITY (2009) (characterizing both Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns as 
late modernists, rather than incipient postmodernists). 
246 A similar paradox has been ascribed to Andy Warhol; Warhol, often credited 
with ending “art,” devoted his life to making “art.” See Louis Menand, Top of the 
Pops, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 57, 63. In addition, Rauschenberg does not 
easily serve as the exemplar of creative destruction. See Bd. of Managers of Soho 
Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at 
*6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (listing Rauschenberg among artists seeking to 
preserve Soho artwork by another artist). Rauschenberg also had a moral rights 
action pending at the time of his death, based on attribution rights. 
247 Adler, supra note 10, at 283 (noting that Abstract Expressionism, initially 
the avant-garde, was effectively institutionalized as the prevailing art form at the 
time of Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning). 
248 See, e.g., Colman, supra note 234 (explaining that contemporary art star 
John Currin became noticed in the 1990s with a show consisting of racy depictions of 
middle-aged, upper-middle-class women and a Village Voice review by Kim Levin 
imploring readers to boycott it); Calvin Tomkins, Lifting the Veil, NEW YORKER, Jan. 
28, 2008, at 58, 62–63 (quoting Currin, “thank God there was that really bad review 
in the Village Voice . . . which got me some attention.”). Earlier examples abound. 
See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 227 (describing Richard Serra as “risen from the ranks 
of the 1960’s avant-garde into the annals of art history”); see also Symposium, The 
Role of the Artist in Today’s Society, 34 ART J. 327, 329 (1975) (“[T]he easiest way to 
get into the art system is to appear to be working outside it or against it.”). 
249 See, e.g., Julia Bryan-Wilson, Sounding the Fury, ARTFORUM, Jan. 2008, at 
95, 95 (noting that Dan Graham’s property-resistant dematerialized conceptual art 
“has proved no escape from the rapaciousness of the market”). 
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Modernist destruction was primarily metaphorical, whereas 
postmodernism made it real.  Professor Adler does not draw a 
hard line between the two,250 but the difference is crucial because 
VARA only interferes with the latter.251  To oppose moral rights 
on grounds that the doctrine stifles creativity implies that the 
literal destruction of single-copy, original works by one’s living 
contemporaries is a necessary condition of innovation or superior 
mode of artistic practice—a theory which, if true, seems 
creatively stalled.252  The theory also appears dissociated from 
the prevailing artistic practice of appropriating widely-available 
copies, rather than original works of art.  Nor does creative 
destruction account for VARA case law, which suggests a less 
interesting yet still relevant truth: that sometimes destruction is 
just destruction.253  Perhaps the locked horns of the destruction-
preservation binary, like that of art-money, is too reductionist.  
Rather, both impulses inform the practices and conceptualization 
of art, and neither one alone can sustain a coherent thesis of 
cultural progress, a dynamic process in which traditions are 
continually reenacted, broken, created, and reinterpreted. 
2. The Vanishing Point 
Perhaps the least anticipated yet most critical challenge 
posed by VARA’s anti-destruction provision is its inability to 
account for cultural obsolescence.  That is, an essential premise 
of the Trois Femmes example, likewise apparent in Buffet’s 
 
250 Picasso, for example, whom Adler quotes as saying, “A picture is a sum of its 
destructions,” Adler, supra note 10, at 263, arguably annihilated traditional artistic 
practices, but he did not literally destroy the works of his peers—aside from Erased 
de Kooning, neither did Rauschenberg. Indeed, Picasso personifies the author-genius 
construct that many postmodern artists have challenged. 
251 Moral rights law flourished in turn-of-the-century France, concurrently with 
its avant-garde modernism. The impressionist Camille Pissarro, for example, spoke 
of “ ‘burn[ing] down the Louvre’ ” in defiance of all artistic tradition. LINDA 
NOCHLIN, THE POLITICS OF VISION: ESSAYS ON NINETEENTH-CENTURY ART AND 
SOCIETY 62 (1st ed. 1989). Destruction as an artistic theme remains compatible with 
museum culture; for example, the Damage Control: Art and Destruction Since 1950 
Exhibit at Hirshorn Museum on display until May 26, 2014. 
252 Professor Adler acknowledges this conflict, writing, “I am wary of blithely 
etching in stone a vision of art, reflecting the current moment, that is doomed to 
become just as outmoded as the romantic concepts underlying moral rights.” Adler, 
supra note 10, at 299. 
253 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 133–135 (explaining that Büchel’s 
bid to the court for destruction, for example, was not in the name of artistic 
creation). 
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refrigerator case, is commercial demand for the artwork in its 
exploited form.  Even in the Erased de Kooning example, as its 
title indicates, a continued association with de Kooning is central 
to the work’s meaning.  Erased de Kooning appears to suggest an 
alternate view of destruction than the Picasso paradigm, i.e., 
destruction as creation, but the paradigms are analogously 
contingent on the legible presence of iconic artists, albeit for 
differing purposes.  These “destroyed” works effectively preserve 
and depend upon the inviolability of the original artist’s 
reputation, still cognizable and carried into the new creation.  
They are both annihilation and homage. 
The anti-destruction case law offers the reverse:  Instead of 
saving highly valued art from commercial exploitation, artists 
have invoked VARA to either compel value or redress inadequate 
value.  Specifically, in a typical VARA case, the owners want to 
destroy, abandon, or rid themselves of the work, not profit from 
the resale or redesign of smaller components.  In Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, for example, the new owners of the building 
containing plaintiffs’ installation simply wanted it gone.254  In 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, the City demolished the plaintiff’s 
twenty-by-forty foot outdoor metal sculpture; there was no resale 
attempt.255  In Pollara v. Seymour, the painted banner was 
crumpled, torn, and discarded by city employees.256 
Accordingly, examples such as Buffet’s refrigerator and 
Erased de Kooning bear little resemblance to VARA’s litigation 
history, where a court usually must decide whether a property 
owner should be compelled to preserve intact a work by a lesser-
known artist with no ulterior use to the owner—including selling 
the work—and which may impinge on other uses of the property 
it inhabits.  Notably, with the exception of Büchel, which was 
atypical in that the VARA defendant was a museum, even the 
mutilation cases have typically not involved either creative or 
commercial exploitation.257  Rather, VARA integrity cases are 
 
254 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
255 Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999). 
256 Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 2003). 
257 Perhaps because there is no definitive test for distinguishing destruction 
from mutilation, it is difficult to identify a consistent rationale for the plaintiff’s 
choice of theory. In Kelley, the artist sued under the mutilation provision only, 
though presumably he could have likewise pleaded the case as destruction. See 
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
380 (2011). The artist may also bring suit under both the mutilation and destruction 
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sustained by works mutilated or destroyed because of their 
perceived lack of exploitability.  They are all annihilation, no 
homage. 
Some scholars have suggested that a principal reason for 
limiting moral rights to works of fine art is that these objects are 
typically acquired for their aesthetic rather than utilitarian value 
and thus are less likely to require modification to perform their 
function.258  That may be true, but this theory splinters as 
applied to the anti-destruction provision, which invites litigation 
on a highly likely outcome of purchasing art for aesthetic value: 
that taste will change, such that the objects no longer have a 
function to perform at all.  As Dario Gamboni points out, 
speaking more generally about cultural artifacts, “it is their 
normal fate to disappear.”259  VARA is thus available as a protest 
of accelerated obsolescence.260  Moreover, as individual specimens 
of an art preservation mandate, VARA disputes are always a 
worst-case scenario in that only works undesired by their owners 
are adjudicated for privileged status.261 
 
provisions. See Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269. One pre-VARA mutilation example 
frequently cited in moral rights literature involved a large mobile by the sculptor 
Alexander Calder, donated to the Pittsburgh airport. The airport had the mobile 
repainted in green and gold (the colors of Allegheny County) and soldered parts to 
prevent motion. Calder sought to have the work restored to its original state in the 
latter two decades of his life, but was unsuccessful. Two years after his death in 
1976, however, the airport agreed to restore the sculpture. See Hansmann & 
Santilli, supra note 22, at 100. At the time Calder fought his battle, he did not own 
the copyright due to the “Pushman doctrine,” by which copyright was presumptively 
transferred with the physical object, a doctrine in effect until the 1976 Copyright 
Act. Id. at 115. Hansmann and Santilli suggest that had Calder retained the 
copyright, he could theoretically have argued that the airport’s reconfiguration and 
repainting of the sculpture was a derivative work; however, case law of this nature 
is undeveloped. See id. But see Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting derivative work argument as a potential “back door” to “an extraordinarily 
broad version of authors’ moral rights”). 
258 KWALL, supra note 7, at 69; Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 103–04. 
259 DARIO GAMBONI, THE DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND VANDALISM 
SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 25 (2007). 
260 In other words, artists have invoked VARA on strictly preservationist 
grounds, rather than for the traditional moral rights harm of misrepresenting the 
artist’s vision. Professor Sax noted a similar trend under the California statute. SAX, 
supra note 56, at 26–32 (remarking that the law was invoked “in almost every 
instance to protect works against destruction”). 
261 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 111 (noting that anti-destruction 
provision will almost always be invoked when a work is not highly valued, “since 
rarely would the owner of a work of ‘recognized stature’ have an incentive to destroy 
it”). 
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This potential rupture between artist and public preference 
sharply contrasts copyright’s utilitarian model, where consumer 
demand determines copyright value.  A novelist, musician, or 
filmmaker may produce a great work that lacks an audience, but 
copyright law offers nothing to keep the unpopular in circulation; 
copyright law controls rights to, rather than helps create, the 
work’s public value.262  Because it defines art yet lacks correlation 
with use, VARA’s anti-destruction provision upends the copyright 
progress model and denies its own cultural context. 
IV. RECONFIGURATION: A POST-OBJECT PROPOSITION 
VARA is a flawed moral rights statute, but the fix is not 
simply to expand its reach; rather, American moral rights law 
needs to be reconceptualized at its foundations.  That the author, 
rather than the physical object, should be the primary focus of 
moral rights law is self-evident.  Yet, as demonstrated, that 
priority does not reflect the development of moral rights in 
American scholarship; it was not the dominant rationale for 
enacting VARA; it is not evidenced in the definitions, exclusions, 
and operative provisions of VARA; and despite the boilerplate 
rhetoric dispensed by courts, it does not reflect their concerns.  
Instead, the goal of identifying and preserving unique objects of 
art eclipsed the author and confounded the doctrine. 
Moral rights theory cannot exclusively reside in a narrow 
class of physical objects to make sense as copyright law, as rights 
of personality, or as arts policy.  As moral rights law, VARA’s 
inclusion of an anti-destruction provision was technically 
expansive, even compared to civil law jurisdictions.  However, 
underwriting moral rights with a social policy tied to art 
preservation has exacted a high tax on authorship concerns, 
while obscuring important but distinct issues of copyright  
 
 
 
262 I do not suggest that the copyright reward system is normatively ideal, but 
only that it provides a direct means of quantifying social value. Notably, this 
problem would not necessarily arise in a law prohibiting the modification of 
reproducible media, because demand inheres in the violation. See, e.g., Preminger v. 
Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 366, 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 599, 603 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 18 
N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80; supra note 128 and accompanying 
text. 
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protection for visual artists.  The focus on objects also misses the 
mark in the art community, establishing an autonomous 
hierarchy that renders VARA both under- and over-inclusive. 
We need to elucidate the goals of moral rights beyond the 
preservation of tangible artifacts.  Doing so requires, initially, 
segregating the issue of “artists’ rights,” which as a synonym for 
moral rights has proven detrimental to visual artists while short-
circuiting the doctrine’s reach to other authors.  Visual artists 
currently appear privileged, dissembling how stringently the 
statute is implemented in accordance with its archaic taxonomy.  
Moreover, framing the moral rights doctrine as a set of 
“privileges” or “special rights,” as has been facilitated by isolating 
a particular type of creator, undermines its legitimacy.263  If 
creators of unique objects are ill-served under copyright law, 
these concerns should be addressed as copyright law.  Moral 
rights should be addressed as a matter of authorship.  It is only 
from a well-defined foundation of authorial dignity as a 
legitimate copyright interest that moral rights can gain traction 
in the law and resist marginalization as a niche issue.  From this 
point, legislators could fashion rights appropriate to the needs of 
different creators. 
This foundation would require flexibility, attuned to 
contemporary theories of creativity and culture.  Moral rights 
discourse has been so colonized with overblown, antiquated 
imagery of the Romantic author that the entire doctrine is easy 
to dismiss as sentimental, utopian, and obsolete.  But neither the 
caricatured Romantic nor Modernist roots of moral rights should 
be grounds for dismissing the doctrine altogether, any more than 
they provide a reason for completely abandoning copyright law.  
Instead, the moral rights doctrine should be narrow, recast in 
contemporary rhetoric and theory that focuses on creative 
participation, authorial voice, and personal dignity, rather than 
transcendence, genius, and preservation of cultural treasures. 
Abandoning an object-based justification for moral rights 
would be consistent with the pervasive use of the internet and 
digital media in creative expression and the concomitant 
proliferation of image appropriation.  In this vein, several 
scholars have advanced proposals for moral rights regimes that 
 
263 I thank Professor Kwall for pointing out that the language of privilege 
generally skews the discussion. 
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favor a more widely-applicable right of attribution, requiring 
accurate designation or disclaimers264 and specifically utilizing 
digital tools such as hyperlinks to unaltered copies, citations, or 
other embedded information.265  Attribution rights conceived in 
these terms encompass goals traditionally served by the integrity 
right, that is, protecting authors from their public association 
with modified works that may be prejudicial to their dignity and 
reputation.266  A moral rights law with this type of structure 
could be circumscribed more by remedy than by a rigid taxonomy 
at the front end, thereby maintaining copyright’s emphasis on 
users’ rights and ensuring consistency with First Amendment 
principles.267 
This Article favors abolishing a distinct right against 
destruction for those who create unique, tangible objects of art, 
except in rare, carefully-defined circumstances.  Specifically, 
rather than cultural preservation’s presumption of serving the 
public interest, the integrity right should depend on use268 of the 
work, as is already implied by modification.  Thus, a privately-
owned work could be freely discarded as unwanted—absented 
from the cultural marketplace without public notice—no matter 
how personally offended the artist might feel upon discovery.  
But if the act or fact of destruction was intentionally exploited in 
a public manner, the artist’s moral rights could be invoked.269 
Under this model, a living artist’s integrity right would be 
implicated if her work was dismembered and sold in pieces—the 
act, rather than the work’s material form or quality, evidencing a 
 
264 See KWALL, supra note 7, at 149–55. 
265 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction: Authorial 
Dignity and the New Moral Rights Agendas, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 537, 562–77 (2011) (discussing attribution models proposed by Professor 
Kwall, as well as Professors Neil Weinstock Netanel and Jessica Litman). 
266 KWALL, supra note 7, at 152–53 (proposing reform that requires link between 
attribution and integrity violations). 
267 A deeper discussion of the relationship between moral rights and First 
Amendment law is beyond the scope of this Article; my analysis has assumed 
constitutional consistency. 
268 I define “use” broadly to include reproduction; display by any means, 
including electronic transmission; commercial sale; exhibition, etc. 
269 I am aware that an exploitation-based approach requires measuring moral 
rights violations through extrinsic means, contrary to the view that moral rights 
should presumptively encompass the subjective impact of destruction. See KWALL, 
supra note 7, at 156 (proposing that prohibition of destruction of works be retained 
for original versions of works of visual art on grounds that authorial dignity is 
necessarily harmed when an artist’s work is destroyed). 
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societal use in which the artist retains a dignity interest.270  
Although exploitive use, as opposed to other proxies of cultural 
value, will not necessarily protect what subsequent generations 
determine to be the “best” work of its time, the lesson of VARA is 
that cultural preservation policy should not be dispensed through 
copyright law, whether in real or symbolic terms.271 
Ultimately, neither the Picasso nor de Kooning situations 
prove to be sound models for crafting contemporary moral rights 
laws, given the case law predicated on an entirely different 
paradigm.272  Rather, cultural norms in creative expression point 
to a more urgent battle, currently being waged in the copyright 
arena, over the line between theft and creative reuse of available 
copies, not unique objects.273  While VARA is irrelevant to these 
disputes, moral rights theory could be useful to copyright’s 
appropriation wars.  As copyright law responds to recycle and 
remix culture, attribution and integrity rights offer a conceptual 
means of addressing, rather than stifling, creative appropriation 
of available imagery.274  In this way, moral rights theory could 
 
270 Similarly, de Kooning, had he objected to Rauschenberg’s exhibited piece, 
could theoretically assert a moral rights violation, except that the Erased de Kooning 
situation was mitigated by proper attribution and an explanation of the change, by 
means of the title. 
271 The case of public art potentially challenges the “exploitive destruction” 
standard, given that destruction would, at least arguably, inherently constitute a 
public act. However, public art might be excepted as inherently noncommercial. 
Alternatively, the work’s use value as art could comprehend the views of the 
community rather than exclusively the owner. 
272 As discussed, most VARA integrity cases have arisen against owners with 
commercial objectives related to property impinged upon, not against other artists or 
art collectors. But cf. Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84 (D.D.C. 2005). In Lilley, 
a photographer sued an artist for incorporating his work without attribution. The 
case was resolved in favor of the defendant because the court determined that the 
plaintiff’s photographs were not produced for exhibition purposes only and therefore 
did not meet VARA’s definition of a work of art. Id. at 88–89. 
273 Unlike in the de Kooning example, where the original artist’s notoriety was 
crucial to the new work, appropriation cases have involved a more successful artist 
using an image by a lesser-known artist. E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246–
47 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303–04 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v. 
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as 
Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 106 (2009) 
(discussing the impact of “postmodern cultural attitude” on copyright law). 
274 A recent news article on Cariou v. Prince and its impact on artists and 
copyright law quoted Virginia Rutledge on society’s “cultural attribution crisis,” 
supporting greater acknowledgment and credit to source artists. Randy Kennedy, 
Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at AR1. 
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help renovate copyright law by injecting authorial dignity as a 
mediating factor rather than an additional, autonomous right.  
Although the nexus of copyright law and creative production 
resists any perfect utilitarian “solution,” the only way for moral 
rights law to engage the conversation is by reconfiguring its 
object. 
CONCLUSION 
VARA is perceived as a moral rights statute whose province 
is exclusively visual artists, but its principal justification lies in 
preserving unique objects of fine art as a form of American 
cultural heritage.  Rather than augmenting the authorship 
interests of artists and the cultural enrichment of the public, 
VARA’s dual purposes reified a conflict.  Copyright law is not an 
effective means of enforcing a policy of art preservation, and 
channeling the latter through the former has profoundly limited 
the moral rights doctrine in the United States, in theory and in 
practice.  Moral rights should be reconceived as rights of 
authorial dignity, rather than rights derived from the protection 
of unique objects.  Consistent with this premise, an anti-
destruction right of integrity for the creator of a unique object of 
art should not lie except in the rare instance of exploitive 
destruction by the owner.  This would avoid compensating artists 
for cultural changes or disuse and thereby help legitimate and 
facilitate the development of other moral rights. 
 
